Evolutionary Game of Fertility Desire of Women of Childbearing Age

Abstract

In recent years, China's fertility rate has shown an obvious downward trend, which has aroused people's widespread concern. As social attitudes change, some women's concepts of childbearing also change and they dont want to have children too early. This paper constructs a game model between the government and women of childbearing age who don't want to have children and explores the effects of economic subsidies, psychological benefits, and job security brought by the government's policies to one-child or two-child families on the fertility desire. Through the study, it was found that current domestic fertility policies have not been effective in promoting higher fertility rates. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium obtained by the line drawing method is a strategy in which the government push fertility policies and women choose not to have children. In order to effectively increase the fertility rate, on the basis of increasing subsidies, the government should guide women who have not given birth to a correct view of fertility and provide women who have given birth to one child with more economic subsidies and employment guarantees.