Evolution of stakeholder behavior strategies in the water quantity eco-compensation mechanism of water use coordination inside and outside the river

Abstract

Eco-compensation is an important means to implement the rights and responsibilities of ecological protection and alleviate the water conflicts inside and outside the river. Previous studies focused on water conflicts among users, overlooking the government's regulatory role in the eco-compensation mechanism and the coordinating function of water transfer compensation fees among users. This study constructed a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government regulatory agencies (GRA), in-channel ecological environment water demanders (EEWD), and off-channel socio-economic water users (SEWU). The evolutionary stability strategies (ESS) of the GRA, EEWD, and SEWU and the evolutionary trend of the tripartite system were analyzed using the finite rationality evolutionary game model, and the sensitivity analysis of the influencing factors was conducted using the eigenvalues of the Jacobi matrix and numerical simulation. Taking the Bai River Basin in Nanyang, China, as the case study, the results showed that the GRA's rewards and penalties were controlled within a reasonable range can promote the enthusiasm of the participating subjects in the water quantity compensation mechanism; water quantity compensation standard for the SEWU was an important indicator for the smooth implementation of the compensation mechanism, the loss coefficient and the overall ecological benefit allocation coefficient of the EEWD will influence the formulation of water quantity compensation standards. This suggested that the GRA should enhance the management of the eco-compensation-related policies and laws and regulations, limit the SEWU's eco-compensation standard, and improve the net benefit of EEWD, to achieve the optimal eco-compensation strategy of ''supervision, protection, compensation''. The research results provide a reference value for the formulation of the water quantity eco-compensation mechanism for water use coordination inside and outside the river.