Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: India's Role and Perception

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has begun to alter the balance of power in the Indian Ocean and evinces the potential to significantly disrupt power dynamics in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) with new regional shifts, power-sharing, partnerships and possibly alliances in future. China's BRI today comprises three primary routes – all leading to the Indian Ocean. The connections between China's Yunnan province and the Indian Ocean through Myanmar; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that links Xinjiang province with the Indian Ocean; and the Oceanic Maritime Silk Road linking the Indian Ocean with China's Pacific coast. These linkages bring the Indian Ocean to the centre of the geopolitics that emerges from the BRI in South Asia, the central apprehension being driven from the link routes that geographically seem to encircle the Indian subcontinent. These concerns, along with unprecedented rising Chinese influence and capabilities in parts of South Asia, have led to a power-scramble involving both regional and extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean, one which seeks to alter the balance of power in the IOR once and for all. This chapter seeks to study the changing power dynamics and balance of power in the IOR, with the Chinese BRI as a starting point and renewed security partnerships in the IOR and the Indo-Pacific as responses to restore a rapidly changing balance in Beijing's favour.

In terms of geographical location and natural endowments, Indian Ocean and the coastal areas naturally have the gene to become a stage for the game of world powers and a key region for the competition of interests; the Indian Ocean Region today is experiencing not only the gradual change of international architecture but also the reconstruction of maritime order in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly important in its strategic position but it is still not the “center stage” or “strategic center” in global politics and economics; in recent years, China’s ambition towards the Indian Ocean has been growing, but that ambition is still a subordinate direction of its geo-strategy (maritime strategy). We shall have rational understanding about the geographical environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the geographical risks in China’s the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean; the principal geographical risk for China in the Indian Ocean Region is not the security of Indian Ocean sea routes but two others: first, regionalization of structural contradictions between big powers; second, complicated and fragile geopolitical ecology in relevant Indian Ocean areas. From the perspective of geostrategic adjustments by big powers, the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” concept indicates the competition between big powers in the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly complicated. The US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, makes the Indian Ocean a major geo-direction in containing China, while the India’s “Maritime Doctrine” also strengthens vigilance against China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, the geopolitical competition between big powers including the US and India are major challenges and geographical risks for China in this region. From the perspective of regional geopolitical ecology, issues like cultural conflicts, resource disputes, poverty, turbulence, territorial disputes and terrorism in the shatter belt make geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Rim complex and fragile, and geographical risks and security in this region have significant spillover effect; local turmoil and political risks with instability in relevant regions have become another main geographical risk for China. Adverse impacts of the two on China’s maintaining and expanding its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region go far beyond the security of Indian Ocean sea routes and unconventional security threats like the Indian Ocean pirates and regional terrorismKeywordsIndian OceanGeo-environmentGeographical risksIndo-Pacific strategyChina’s Indian Ocean strategy

Maritime security in the Indian Ocean: confronting non-traditional security threats with regional cooperation

With the implementation of trade protectionism by western countries dominated by the US and EU, particularly the redefinition of trade rules by the Trump administration based on the “America First” policy, over the past two years, China’s foreign trade and investment will expand into the Indian Ocean region at a faster pace, and China will become an increasingly important economic and security stakeholder in the region. Moreover, the US is shifting its strategic focus from anti-terrorism to checking “strategic rivals”, hoping the countries within the Indian Ocean region like India and Australia will assume more security responsibilities. That causes new changes to the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and the strategic competition among powers in the Indian Ocean region is increasingly intensified. Meanwhile, instead of being eased, the instability of the security situation across the Indian Ocean shows a sign of further deterioration. In the future, the US will still be the biggest variable that affects the international environment in the Indian Ocean region, and India, as a power within the region, will become a main variable that affects the international environment in the region. Amid the changing international environment across the Indian Ocean region, China will have fast growing demand for security in the region, which will prompt China to include the Indian Ocean into its strategic vision to meet its rising economic interests and security demand in the region and ease the pressure from the strategic competition among powers. According to this report, although China is not a country in the Indian Ocean, it’s a country close to the Indian Ocean. That is to say, China is the power outside but closest to the Indian Ocean. As the economic relations between China and the countries along the Indian Ocean coast has become increasingly closer in recent years, both traditional and non-traditional security challenges are growing in the region; in particular, given the strategic importance of the Eastern Indian Ocean, which is adjacent to South China Sea, to China’s peripheral environment, actively creating the political, economic and security environment favorable to China in the Indian Ocean region will be a choice for China’s foreign strategy in the next decade or even a longer period of time. In the Indian Ocean region, China has been, is, and will always be a builder that promotes economic prosperity, a participant that develops international rules and a contributor that safeguards common security. The main objective of China’s Indian Ocean strategy is to safeguard its freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and ensure its security of maritime transport, and to have the capability to expand its economic interest in the Indian Ocean region. This requires China to have corresponding military defense and projection capabilities, and to play a constructive role that matches its own capabilities in the field of security governance in the Indian Ocean.KeywordsIndian Ocean strategyInternational EnvironmentStrategic GameBelt and Road Initiative

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).This essay first summarizes China's growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China's presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China's failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.China's Imperatives in the Indian OceanChina's primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country's strategic thinking.An additional factor is that China's military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed by a considerable and growing margin. China's naval presence has grown in connection with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China's One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.India's Aspirations in the Indian OceanIndia considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less India's ocean. 1 As Donald Berlin has commented, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region-the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. 2India's views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country's colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled India's Monroe Doctrine. The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider. …

<p>Indian Summer Monsoon is vulnerable to climate change. Analysis of precipitation over India suggests more increase in extreme precipitation over south India as compared to north and central India during post-1970 (1971-2017) as compared to pre-1970 (1930-1970) (Suman and Maity, 2020). This contrast in the characteristics of extreme precipitation over south and north India is expected to continue as revealed by the analysis of precipitation from the Coordinated Regional Downscaling Experiment (CORDEX) simulations. Additionally, precipitation extreme are expected to shift southward over South Asia in the future (2006-2100 as compared to 1961-2005). For instance, the Arabian Sea, south India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Malaysia are expected to have the maximum increase (~18.5 mm/day for RCP8.5 scenario) in mean extreme precipitation (average precipitation for the days with more than 99<sup>th</sup> percentile of daily precipitation). However, north and central India and Tibetan Plateau show relatively less increase (~2.7 mm/day for RCP8.5 scenario). The increase in extreme precipitation over most part of South Asia can be attributed to stronger monsoon due to increase in air temperature over Tibetan Platue and Himalayas, stronger positive Indian Ocean Dipole events, and high precipitatible water over land areas in the future. However, while analysis of moisture flux and moisture convergence at 850mb, an intense eastward shift is noticed for moisture flux (over Indian Ocean region). This shift in moisture flux along with associated changes in moisture convergence over landmass are found to intensify during days with extreme precipitation. These changes are expected to intensify the observed contrast in extreme precipitation over south and north India and shift the extreme precipitation southward over south Asia, causing more extreme precipitation events in the countries like Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, etc.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Extreme Precipitation; Indian Summer Monsoon; Climate Change; Indian Ocean Dipole.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Reference:</strong></p><p>Suman, M., Maity, R. (2020), Southward shift of precipitation extremes over south Asia: Evidences from CORDEX data. <em>Sci Rep</em> <strong>10, </strong>6452 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-63571-x.</p>

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1 Shen Dingli, ‘Don't Shun the Idea of Setting up Overseas Military Bases’, January 28, 2010, at http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2010-01/28/content_19324522.htm. 2 Edward Wong, ‘Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power’, New York Times, April 23, 2010. 3 Youssef Bodansky, ‘The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US’, Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, DC, September 30, 1995, pp. 6–13. 4 Manu Pubby, ‘China's New N-Submarine Base Sets off Alarm Bells’, Indian Express, May 3, 2008. 5 The term ‘string of pearls’ was first used in a report entitled ‘Energy Futures in Asia’, commissioned by the US Department of Defence's Office of Net Assessment from defence contractor Booz-Allen-Hamilton. For details, see David Walgreen, ‘China in the Indian Ocean Region: Lessons in PRC Grand Strategy’, Comparative Strategy, 25(2), 2006, pp. 55–73. Also see Jae-Hyung Lee, ‘China's Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 24(3), 2007, pp. 553–554. 6 For a detailed explanation of the security ramifications of the Chinese ‘string of pearls’ strategy, see Gurpreet Khurana, ‘China's “String of Pearls” in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications’, Strategic Analysis, 32(1), 2008, pp. 1–22. 7 Ziad Haider, ‘Oil Fuels Beijing's New Power Game’, Yale Global Online, at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/oil-fuels-beijings-new-power-game. 8 On India's role in shaping Sino-Pakistan ties, see Harsh V. Pant, ‘The Pakistani Thorn in China-India–US Relations’, The Washington Quarterly, 25(1), 2012, pp. 83–95. 9 Saibal Dasgupta, ‘China Mulls Setting up Military Base in Pakistan’, Times of India, January 28, 2010. 10 The rapidly changing balance of power in the Asia-Pacific is discussed in Harsh V. Pant, China's Rising Global Profile: The Great Power Tradition, Sussex Academic Press, Portland, OR, 2011, pp. 11–28. 11 Geoffrey Till concludes from this that the Chinese government appears ‘to have a very clear vision of the future importance of the sea and a sense of the strategic leadership needed to develop maritime interest’. Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Frank Cass, London, 2004, p. 102. 12 For a detailed examination of the contemporary state of Sino-Indian relations, see Harsh V. Pant, The China Syndrome: Grappling with an Uneasy Relationship, HarperCollins, New Delhi, 2010. 13 Manu Pubby, ‘Indian Submarine, Chinese Warship Test Each Other in Pirate Waters’, Indian Express, February 5, 2009. 14 Ben Bland and Girija Shivakumar, ‘China Confronts Indian Navy Vessel’, Financial Times, August 31, 2011.

An evaluation of tsunami hazard using Bayesian approach in the Indian Ocean

The research objective of this paper is the presentation of the influence (significance) of the geopolitical factor in Poland’s relations with the Russian Federation (Russia) and the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) in the post-Cold War period, first and foremost the influence on the shares of convergent and divergent (contradictory) interests of Poland and the two countries, as well as relevant dilemmas concerning Poland’s foreign and security policies. The main research thesis is that the geopolitical factor remains one of the chief determinants of Poland’s relations with Russia and Germany despite the changes taking place in the international system (e.g. the acceleration of globalisation processes) in the last few decades. In the post-Cold War period, however, it affected Poland’s relations with Russia in a much more negative way than it did the Polish-German relations. The German problem in its traditional sense of a hazard source diminished considerably in the Polish foreign policy in the abovementioned period, while the significance of the Russian problem increased. The decision makers of the Polish foreign policy viewed Germany first and foremost as a partner and an ally (within NATO), while Russia was seen as the main hazard to Polish security, including a military hazard in the form of a direct invasion. Wishing to present more detailed matters, the paper brings to the fore i.a. the issues concerning the essence of the geopolitical factor in the foreign policies of countries, certain conditions of Poland’s geopolitical location in the post-Cold War period, the main stages of Poland’s relations with Germany and Russia in that period together with their characteristics, the main areas of divergent interests in Poland’s relations with Germany and Russia in the second decade of the 21st century, the similarities and differences in Poland’s policy toward Germany and Russia in the post-Cold War period as well as the main dilemmas of the Polish foreign policy toward the end of the second decade of the 21st century stemming from Poland’s geopolitical location between Russia and Germany. One main conclusion formulated on the basis on those deliberations is that Poland’s geopolitical location between Russia and Germany does not doom Polish relations with the two countries to a confrontational nature for historical reasons. The geopolitical factor is not an independent prime mover; it does not entail geopolitical determinism which automatically eliminates the possibility of influencing Poland’s geopolitical situation by subsequent Polish governments. The geopolitical location does not determine eternal enemies or eternal friends because one can derive various conceptions, programmes and objectives of the foreign policy from the same geopolitical location of Poland.

Geopolitics is essential in understanding global dynamics, economic and resource considerations, cultural interlinkages, global governance for common humanitarian causes, foreign policy, diplomacy and security. Today, geopolitics as a concept transcends temporality and ventures into technological innovations, interdependence, demographic shifts, transnational threats, and involvement of non-state actors. The emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical construct is accompanied by the nations’ quest to establish themselves in prominent positions in the region. India, too, is not alien to this quest. India’s geopolitical move from its neighbourhood to the Indo-Pacific hence becomes a critical point of analysis in the nation’s aspiration to become the regional leader. The evolution of geopolitics from a nation-state-centric paradigm of the 20th century to a multi-pivotal approach in the 21st century reflects the current highly interdependent global order. Nation-states shape their foreign policies based on internal and external factors, with the Indo-Pacific region assuming increasing significance, particularly concerning maritime interests, both developmental and strategic. Historically, India has played a prominent role in the Indian Ocean region, contributing significantly to global trade and cultural diffusion. Over time, the land borders assumed priority over the maritime space. However, the shared yet contesting interests in the region with various nation-states competing for their claims, the attention returned to the seas. These competing claims and claimants in the region highlight the vitality of India to have a stringent and proactive foreign and maritime security policy – for the region and in the region. This research delves into the evolving discourse of geopolitics, particularly in the Indo-Pacific construct, and its intersection with maritime security. By analysing India's strategic viewpoint, particularly its maritime strategy, through scholarly and official sources, this paper aims to elucidate the critical linkages between geopolitics and maritime security. Ultimately, it seeks to underscore India's role as a key agenda-setter in the region. Keywords Geopolitics, Indo­Pacific, Maritime Security, Security Dilemma

The Sino-Indian competition is not a recent development when it comes to global and regional affairs. In recent years, the crisis between China and India has manifested serious geostrategic risks to the stability and safety of the South Asian region and maritime domain. This paper precisely analyses the Sino Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean where both the Asian powers are regarded as one of the most significant naval capabilities for their geostrategic vision. An overview of China’s and India’s strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is what this study aims to convey in the first section. The section analyzes the geo political and geo-economic importance of Indian Ocean for both China and India. The latter section sheds light on China’s growing concern for the IOR stemmed from its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) security and explains the expanding activities of China in the region. The Indian security community views China’s continued modernization of its military, increased power projection in the Indian Ocean, and political and economic ties with the IOR states as measures to counterbalance India’s dominance in the region. The next section outlines how China’s increasing sway in the IOR is becoming a major worry for New Delhi. In an effort to project power and protect its strategic interests both inside and outside the IOR, India has worked to modernize and bolster its armed forces over the past ten years, particularly the navy. India is currently envisioning a more grandiose and newer role for itself in the IOR by procuring infrastructure in a number of IOR countries. India has been trying to thwart China’s attempts to establish IOR dominance. This, combined with India’s essential naval build-up and overwhelming spatial advantage, would significantly challenge China’s goal of enhancing its leverage in the IOR through its “String of Pearls.” Thus, all these counter activities of the two Asian powers against each other have gradually been fueling the maritime competition in the IOR a more intense one. BIMRAD Journal VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, DEC 2024; PP-63-84

This article focuses on the regional requirements for a pacification of Afghanistan. For this purpose, Afghanistan is analytically "reframed" as part of South Asia. The hypothesis is that India is the only regional actor that might possess both the incentives and the capabilities to deal with the negative security externalities emanating from Afghanistan.In South Asia, material characteristics such as the delineation of the region and its power polarity are unclear. India's role within the region is even more controversial. By examining India's role within its security environment, this paper will suggest how this lack of clarity could be remedied. In light of the disputes between India and Pakistan and between Pakistan and Afghanistan, India's involvement in the Afghan conflict is probably the most critical test case for India's leadership potential. The following section elaborates a theoretical framework based on Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) and the concept of regional hegemony as one form of regional order.

Using the NCEP-NCAR reanalysis for the 1950-2000 period, differences in the atmospheric hydrological cycle between the extremes of ENSO (i.e., La Nina minus El Nino) are examined. Zonal vertically integrated moisture transport (VIMT) across 1008E accounts for about half of the variability in net moisture convergence in the north Indian Ocean region between ENSO extremes when all ENSO events are considered. Changes in VIMT across 1008E are associated with large changes in the strength of the Pacific Ocean trade wind regime during ENSO. The bulk of the remaining VIMT anomalies are from the Arabian Sea and appear to be associated with sea level pressure variations in the northern and western parts of the Indian Ocean Basin. This initial analysis, therefore, suggests that the interaction between the monsoon and ENSO may be more complex than the direct modulation of VIMT by the Pacific Ocean trade winds alone. The analysis is refined further by comparing the differences of the Indian and Pacific Ocean hydrological cycles between ENSO extremes when they occur concurrently with anomalous monsoons (ENSO-anomalous monsoon years (EAM)), and when the monsoon is normal (ENSO-normal monsoon years (ENM)). For both EAM and ENM years, similar differences exist in VIMT across 1008E between ENSO extremes. However, major differences are noted in VIMT anomalies from the west and south into the north Indian Ocean region. Thus, the principal difference in moisture convergence in the north Indian Ocean between EAM and ENM years is associated primarily with VIMT anomalies in the western Indian Ocean region and not those in the eastern Indian or Pacific Oceans. To test the hypothesis that Pacific Ocean SST anomalies occurring prior to the monsoon may be important in influencing the eventual nature of the monsoon, the analysis is extended backward to the spring period. While May SST differences in the Nino-3 region between ENSO extremes are found to be similar for both EAM and ENM years, VIMT differences in both the Indian Ocean and the central and western Pacific Oceans are sig- nificantly larger during EAM years than ENM years. May SST differences in the central subtropical Pacific Ocean are also significantly larger during EAM than ENM years. These results show that the anomalous SST gradient between the eastern equatorial and the central subtropical Pacific Ocean prior to the monsoon onset, together with its associated VIMTs anomalies, may be important factors in determining the degree of connection between monsoon and ENSO. In addition, the circulation in the Indian Ocean prior to and during the monsoon onset shares a strong association with the eventual intensity of the monsoon-ENSO coupling.

ABSTRACTIndia perceives itself as a net security provider and a balancer of power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This has resulted in the emergence of the Indian Navy (IN) as an important actor in the implementation of India’s foreign policy that embraces a holistic approach towards maritime security cooperation and capacity building. Having overcome its Cold War era isolationistic profile, the IN has expanded its maritime outreach in the IOR and beyond the region. Given that India is perceived as a benign power this has proved to be a strategic advantage in favor of India. The prime driver of increasing role of IN is to counter Chinese moves in the IOR following New Delhi’s discomfort and apprehension with China. To address this, the IN has been conducting regular joint exercises for enhancing interoperability, largesse towards weapon inventory, port visits and coordinated patrols, and assistance. In addition, the IN follows a cooperative approach for sharing of security-related technology. In this manner, the IN has successfully furthered India’s foreign policy objectives while achieving its maritime and strategic aims.

In February 2008, India hosted naval chiefs from around the Indian Ocean in what was named the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, highlighting the role of the Indian navy as an important instrument of the nation's foreign and security policy. It was also an attempt by India to promote a multilateral approach in the management of the security of the Indian Ocean. India signalled that as a rising power it is willing to fulfil its maritime responsibilities in the region but, unlike in the past when India had been suspicious of what it saw as extra-regional navies, it is now ready to cooperate with other navies in and around the Indian Ocean. Whether India's leadership will be enough to promote genuine maritime multilateralism in the region, however, remains to be seen. The Indian Ocean has long been the hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics. It is third-largest of the world's five oceans and straddles Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indochina in the east, and Antarctica in the south. Home to four critical access waterways?the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca?the Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.1 Given its crucial geographical role, major powers have long vied with each other for its control, though it was only in the nineteenth century that Great Britain was able to enjoy an overwhelming dominance in the region. With the decline in Britain's relative power and the emergence of two superpowers during the Cold War, the Indian Ocean region became another arena where the US and the former Soviet Union struggled to expand their power and influence. The US, however, has remained the most significant player in the region for the last several years. Given the rise of major economic powers in the Asia-Pacific that rely on energy imports to sustain their economic growth, the Indian Ocean region has assumed a new importance as various powers are once again vying for the control of the waves in this part of the world. Nearly half of the world's