Changes of the International Environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the Strategic Choices for China

In terms of geographical location and natural endowments, Indian Ocean and the coastal areas naturally have the gene to become a stage for the game of world powers and a key region for the competition of interests; the Indian Ocean Region today is experiencing not only the gradual change of international architecture but also the reconstruction of maritime order in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the twenty-first century, the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly important in its strategic position but it is still not the “center stage” or “strategic center” in global politics and economics; in recent years, China’s ambition towards the Indian Ocean has been growing, but that ambition is still a subordinate direction of its geo-strategy (maritime strategy). We shall have rational understanding about the geographical environment in the Indian Ocean Region and the geographical risks in China’s the Belt and Road Initiative in the Indian Ocean; the principal geographical risk for China in the Indian Ocean Region is not the security of Indian Ocean sea routes but two others: first, regionalization of structural contradictions between big powers; second, complicated and fragile geopolitical ecology in relevant Indian Ocean areas. From the perspective of geostrategic adjustments by big powers, the rise of the “Indo-Pacific” concept indicates the competition between big powers in the Indian Ocean Region becomes increasingly complicated. The US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, in particular, makes the Indian Ocean a major geo-direction in containing China, while the India’s “Maritime Doctrine” also strengthens vigilance against China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Therefore, the geopolitical competition between big powers including the US and India are major challenges and geographical risks for China in this region. From the perspective of regional geopolitical ecology, issues like cultural conflicts, resource disputes, poverty, turbulence, territorial disputes and terrorism in the shatter belt make geopolitics in the Indian Ocean Rim complex and fragile, and geographical risks and security in this region have significant spillover effect; local turmoil and political risks with instability in relevant regions have become another main geographical risk for China. Adverse impacts of the two on China’s maintaining and expanding its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region go far beyond the security of Indian Ocean sea routes and unconventional security threats like the Indian Ocean pirates and regional terrorismKeywordsIndian OceanGeo-environmentGeographical risksIndo-Pacific strategyChina’s Indian Ocean strategy

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).This essay first summarizes China's growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China's presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China's failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.China's Imperatives in the Indian OceanChina's primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country's strategic thinking.An additional factor is that China's military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed by a considerable and growing margin. China's naval presence has grown in connection with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy's antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China's One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.India's Aspirations in the Indian OceanIndia considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less India's ocean. 1 As Donald Berlin has commented, New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region-the world's only region and ocean named after a single state. 2India's views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country's colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled India's Monroe Doctrine. The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider. …

Maritime security is a broad and vague area, though it could be defined as the security dealing with the prevention of illicit activities in the maritime domain. Indian Ocean has become multifaceted and dynamic. Indian Ocean regional maritime security has become a key factor as the Indian Ocean Region transitions from an international backwater, a mere route for maritime trade, to a major global nexus of resource, human, economic and environmental issues. The Indian Ocean Region contains a large proportion of the world's failed and failing states, including 11 of the 20 states listed in Foreign Policy Journal 's 2009 article 'The Failed State Index'. 2 The non-traditional threats to security comprise threat of non-state actors. The trafficking of narcotics, weapons and people continues to be a great concern. The likelihood of terrorist attack has become a major concern. Although terrorist attacks on shipping remain relatively low, the threat of terrorism must be viewed as credible. Any major attack can easily disrupt global economy. Maritime security concerns in the Indian Ocean continue to be dominated by piracy and armed robbery at sea, especially hijacking of merchant vessels. Therefore, maritime security in the Indian Ocean Region is an apt model of Buzan and Weaver's 'regional security complex', that is, a group of states united by common security problems of the region. 3Geographically, the Indian Ocean is the third-largest ocean in the world, covering 68.556 million sq. km or 20 per cent of the earth's water surface. 4 Broadly, it has been bounded by India in its north; Africa in its west; Thailand, the Malay Peninsula, Indonesia, Malaysiaand Australia in its east; and Antarctica in its south. The Indian Ocean also embraces many seas like Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, the Gulf of Mannar and the Gulf of Oman. The major ports in the Indian Ocean are Chennai, Colombo, Durban, Jakarta, Kolkata, Melbourne, Mumbai and Richards Bay. 5 There are several choke points in the Indian Ocean such as the Mozambique Channel, the Bab-elMandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, the Malacca Strait and the Lombok Strait. 6 According to Michel and Sticklor, 38 states have influence over the Indian Ocean Region. Some of the 38 states are Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Comoros, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. France and United Kingdom are also included because of their island territories. 7 These countries draw 40 per cent of the world's total coastlines. In 2010, the population of Indian Ocean Region comprises almost onethird, that is 35.70 per cent, of the world's total population while the average Human Development Index of this region is only 0.597 in comparison to the world average of 0.682. Looking at the brief history of the Indian Ocean, one can say that the Indian Ocean has been a significant route, making it accessible for traders from the worldwide. The western Indian Ocean was dominated by the Persians from the third century to the seventh century while the Arabs dominated the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean from seventh century to the fourteenth century. The Arabs occupied the coastline of East Africa, the north-western coastline of India and Southeast Asia. Rais is of the view that the neglect of the naval strategy by the Arabs led European traders to enter the Indian Ocean. 8The Portuguese came with the aim to monopolize over the Asian trade, especially in spices. The Portuguese occupied Colombo, Socotra, Goa and Melaka, but by the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch started occupying most of the Portuguese domains. The Dutch formed the United East India Company in 1602 to promote the eastern trade. It is said that Spain's occupation of Portugal in 1580 and religious intolerance and lack of commercial associations in Portugal led to weaken Portugal, while newly discovered Brazil diverted its focus from the Indian Ocean. Because of the lack of resources, the Dutch failed in effectively controlling the region. The war with England and alteration in Dutch colonial policies led Dutch to lose their domination to the British and the French in the seventeenth century. The English established the East India Company in 1601, while the French East India Company was established in 1604. The Indian Ocean has been called 'British Lake'. 9By the end of the Second World War, almost all the countries of Indian Ocean area got independence from the colonial domination. However, following the Cold War between the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, the Indian Ocean occupied centre stage in the foreign policies of the super power because of their strategic and economic interest in the region. Chomsky argued that the United States is interested in the region because of its oil reserves. However, the Cold War reached the Indian Ocean in the 1960s and 1970s. Both the United States and the USSR tried to install their naval bases and submarines in the Indian Ocean. The United Nations declared the Indian Ocean as the zone of peace in 1971. Bouchard and Crumplin argued that the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Israel-Palestine war of 1973, Gulf oil crisis in 1973 and 1979, the Indian nuclear test in 1974, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s gave Indian Ocean a geostrategic importance. After the end of Cold War, the United States intervened in Iraq-Kuwait war in 1991. The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and the military intervention in Iraq in 2003 brought instability to the region. The war between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1983 to 2009 also brought turmoil to the region. It is argued that India is a great power in the Indian Ocean Region while China is also gradually proving its presence in the region. 10Maritime rights of the nations are enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but these rights are sometimes in conflict with their strategic interests. The Indian Ocean Region has now turned into a multidimensional and dynamic region; however, it was neglected for a long time. Venkatshamy is of the view that Indian Ocean has an increasingly important role to play in the geopolitics in the coming times. Forty-eight out of 63 ports in Asia are located in the Indian Ocean Region. By 2013, it has become the pivot of trade and energy as the region has 61 per cent of total global container traffic besides 70 per cent of the petroleum products transportation. 11 The Malacca Strait is the major shipping route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, connecting Asia, Middle East and Europe. The 550-mile strait is a vital choke point in the Indian Ocean as more than 50,000 merchant ships travel by the waterways every year. 12 'If Straits get blocked, almost half of the world's fleet would need to reroute through the Sunda or Lombok Straits.' 13 The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean Region has made many extra-regionalstates to keep a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 14 It is said that most of the armed conflicts are located in the Indian Ocean Region. According to Venkatshamy, 45 per cent of the world's conflicts (such as Palestine and Israel, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan) and 75 per cent of the world natural disasters occur in the Indian Ocean Region. 15The region is said to be very rich in the natural resources like gold, tin, uranium, cobalt, nickel, aluminium and cadmium. It is estimated that the region contains almost 55 per cent of recognized oil reserves and around 40 per cent of gas reserves. According to Berlin, in 2011, 40 per cent of trade in oil transports passed through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 per cent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 per cent through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. Most of the energy exports from the five major world oil producers pass the narrow route of the Indian Ocean. 16 It is argued that the growing interest of the Gulf Cooperation countries in the Indian Ocean is because of the gradual increase in the consumption of energy by India and China. It is argued that countries like the United States, China, India and Japan are increasingly depending on energy supplied by Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar, Kuwait and Iran, making Indian Ocean Region more and more important in the coming decades or rather century. 17Besides its economic importance, Indian Ocean Region also has military significance. The island of Diego Garcia has been a major airnaval base of the United States in the Indian Ocean. The United States has also installed some major naval task forces such as Combined Task Force 152 and Combined Task Force 150, while France has its naval bases installed in Djibouti, Reunion and Abu Dhabi. China has commercial ports at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan. Port construction by the Chinese is also under way in Myanmar and Bangladesh. It is argued that Marao Atoll in Maldives is among potential Chinese military bases.

China’s port facility construction projects in the Indian Ocean (IO) region, particularly those in Gwadar and Djibouti, have led to a heated debate among strategists over whether the country has been carrying out a ‘string of pearls’ strategy, an alleged Chinese scheme to challenge America’s military predominance in South Asia. Although Beijing has denied the existence of such a strategy, it has enhanced its strategic ties with littoral countries in the IO region over the past few years. This article discusses the evolution of Beijing’s IO strategy and examines the nature of these Chinese port projects. It argues that rather than simply copying the American model of developing military bases overseas, China has been deliberating a more sophisticated plan for its physical presence there—creating a new set of ‘overseas strategic pivots’. These ‘pivots’ are designed to help Beijing sustain its anti-piracy campaign and serve as forward stations for the transportation of China’s imported energy and merchandise while, with a relatively low-key stance, reducing any unnecessary opposing actions by rival powers. In addition, their political and economic functions are to a certain extent greater than their military functions despite the fact that they appear to be military bases. More importantly, these ‘pivots’ can help China create closer partnerships with littoral governments in the IO region, which suggests that the country is trying to create a friendly international environment favouring its plan to step into the global maritime domain.

Prospects for China's Maritime Strategy in the Indian Ocean Hu Bo (bio) There is much exaggerated speculation about China's military strategy in the Indian Ocean, including the so-called string of pearls, and military intentions for the Belt and Road Initiative. Before analyzing China's Indian Ocean strategy over the next ten to fifteen years, it is first useful to focus on some general development trends of sea power rather than speculation about China's intentions. The Dominance of Sea Denial Today, we are living in a period of sea-denial dominance. Because maritime hegemony is so expensive to gain and sustain in the 21st century, no powers, including the United States and China, can have the capacity and bear the cost. Compared with sea control, sea denial is a much more realistic and cheaper goal. Definitions of sea control and sea denial vary according to different perspectives, and the two concepts are usually intertwined. Nonetheless, from a strategic perspective, we may define sea control as assuring one's own use of the sea and denying its use to the rivals in wartime. Sea denial, by contrast, can be defined as preventing adversaries from using the sea. Sea control means the desire to gain maritime dominance, whereas sea denial entails a balance of power. The 2020 version of the U.S. Navy's Naval Doctrine Publication 1 defines sea denial as an "offensive, cost-imposing approach that can be applied when it is impossible or unnecessary to establish sea control."1 Achieving sea control has always been more difficult than sea denial because the former is highly dependent on a country's capacity to project air and naval power, while the latter does not require massive power projection and intense joint operations. Moreover, today's task of sea control includes joint operations in all domains—land, sea, air, space, [End Page 18] and cyber—and the vulnerability of any domain may mean that the strategy fails. What makes sea denial different now from the past is the rapid improvement in sensor, guidance, and communication technology in recent decades and new ways of implementing strategies that such technology creates.2 Therefore, states are increasingly able to threaten an opponent's ships at long range from relatively safer and cheaper land-based aircraft and missile batteries—a range of capabilities termed anti-access/area-denial by U.S. military planners.3 Thus, with heightened interdependence of great powers and multiple paths of military technology, maritime predominance is becoming increasingly difficult to obtain, and perhaps will even be impossible in the future. However, for great powers, it is progressively simpler to ensure the other side's fleet cannot sail unhindered if needed. In this regard, most waters of the world are in the contested "no man's sea."4 Usually, great powers enjoy an advantage in their near seas and must accept others' advantages elsewhere. The United States may be the only exception based on its status as a superpower and its alliance system. However, even the United States is finding it harder to maintain its edge, especially in the western Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Arctic. China's Interests in the Indian Ocean China is a power with a relatively unfavorable marine geography, and it has no formal military ally around the Indian Ocean. No matter how China rises, it would be difficult for the country to wield dominant sea power in the Indian Ocean region as long as the United States and India make no major strategic mistakes nor suffer a sharp decline in national power. In the Indian Ocean, China is confronted with a similar anti-access dilemma and the disadvantage of distance that the United States faces in East Asian waters. Therefore, China can only operate in the ocean as a relatively weak sea power, or perhaps by using a "fleet in being" strategy, which means maintaining an effective but inferior military presence so as to deter and [End Page 19] check the stronger sea power from obtaining absolute command of the sea and violating its own vital interests.5 At present and for the foreseeable future, China's most important interest in the Indian Ocean is to...

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has begun to alter the balance of power in the Indian Ocean and evinces the potential to significantly disrupt power dynamics in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) with new regional shifts, power-sharing, partnerships and possibly alliances in future. China's BRI today comprises three primary routes – all leading to the Indian Ocean. The connections between China's Yunnan province and the Indian Ocean through Myanmar; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that links Xinjiang province with the Indian Ocean; and the Oceanic Maritime Silk Road linking the Indian Ocean with China's Pacific coast. These linkages bring the Indian Ocean to the centre of the geopolitics that emerges from the BRI in South Asia, the central apprehension being driven from the link routes that geographically seem to encircle the Indian subcontinent. These concerns, along with unprecedented rising Chinese influence and capabilities in parts of South Asia, have led to a power-scramble involving both regional and extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean, one which seeks to alter the balance of power in the IOR once and for all. This chapter seeks to study the changing power dynamics and balance of power in the IOR, with the Chinese BRI as a starting point and renewed security partnerships in the IOR and the Indo-Pacific as responses to restore a rapidly changing balance in Beijing's favour.

ABSTRACTThis paper reviews the existing multilateral structures in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) – notably the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) – in the context of various geopolitical facets, ranging from geoeconomics to regional security and good order. It examines and recommends options to bolster economic multilateralism in the IOR though a comprehensive two-fold approach. The first one seeks to enhance intraregional trade, maritime–economic connectivity, and technology sharing, delving into issues relating to a region-wide free trade agreement (FTA), the amalgamation of economic corridors within IORA, and the “Make in India” initiative. The second is founded upon the indispensability of a secure and conducive maritime environment for economic development, and addresses maritime safety and security (MSS), as also “good order” in the IOR. It suggests measures to bolster the IORA’s nascent MSS architecture with a web of bilateral, trilateral and subregional mechanisms, emphasising the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) as the key functional enabler of IORA’s MSS agenda. It also examines the imminent challenges relating to freedom of navigation (FoN), and undertakes an appraisal of Sri Lanka’s draft Code of Conduct (CoC) for the Indian Ocean. The arguments presented hinge upon the suggestion that the collective approach of the IOR countries should ideally be in consonance with India’s prime-ministerial enunciation of the concept of SAGAR – security and growth for all in the region. If each Indian Ocean country’s economy is a “boat”, the Indian “boat” cannot rise unless all “boats” rise with a rising economic tide.

An evaluation of tsunami hazard using Bayesian approach in the Indian Ocean

Despite having the longest coastline and the broadest jurisdiction of waters in the region, Australia has not been a major force in the Indian Ocean region for a long time, which is related to its maritime strategy and diplomatic tradition focusing on the Pacific Ocean. However, as the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy, China’s BRI projects and India's big ambition further in this area, along with Australia's economic ties with the region, Australia is putting more attention and resource to the Indian Ocean region, stirring up security situation of this region and complicating strategic competition. From both structural pressure and unit-level incentive, it is highly necessary for Australia to re-examine the way it interacts with countries within the region and major external powers on the Indian Ocean. In terms of system pressure, Australia is noticing the strategic competitiveness escalating and even a “power vacuum” in the Indian Ocean region brought by the relative decline of American power, as well as the traditional and non-traditional threats to its western coast. At the reductive level, the transfer of domestic resources development and export to the west front of Australia, with the economic opportunities presenting in the Indian Ocean region also enable it to recognize those significant opportunities and benefits. Of course, as to specific policies and policy implementation of Australia on the Indian Ocean still, to some extent, depends on the evolution of its complex domestic politics, but what is certain is that Australia will continue to boost its influence on the political, economic and security situation of the Indian Ocean region, which might put forward new challenges on the dynamic of Sino Australian relationsKeywordsAustralian national strategyIndian Ocean regional orderMajor Power relations

The Sino-Indian competition is not a recent development when it comes to global and regional affairs. In recent years, the crisis between China and India has manifested serious geostrategic risks to the stability and safety of the South Asian region and maritime domain. This paper precisely analyses the Sino Indian maritime competition in the Indian Ocean where both the Asian powers are regarded as one of the most significant naval capabilities for their geostrategic vision. An overview of China’s and India’s strategic objectives in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is what this study aims to convey in the first section. The section analyzes the geo political and geo-economic importance of Indian Ocean for both China and India. The latter section sheds light on China’s growing concern for the IOR stemmed from its Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) security and explains the expanding activities of China in the region. The Indian security community views China’s continued modernization of its military, increased power projection in the Indian Ocean, and political and economic ties with the IOR states as measures to counterbalance India’s dominance in the region. The next section outlines how China’s increasing sway in the IOR is becoming a major worry for New Delhi. In an effort to project power and protect its strategic interests both inside and outside the IOR, India has worked to modernize and bolster its armed forces over the past ten years, particularly the navy. India is currently envisioning a more grandiose and newer role for itself in the IOR by procuring infrastructure in a number of IOR countries. India has been trying to thwart China’s attempts to establish IOR dominance. This, combined with India’s essential naval build-up and overwhelming spatial advantage, would significantly challenge China’s goal of enhancing its leverage in the IOR through its “String of Pearls.” Thus, all these counter activities of the two Asian powers against each other have gradually been fueling the maritime competition in the IOR a more intense one. BIMRAD Journal VOLUME 5, ISSUE 1, DEC 2024; PP-63-84

The Indian Ocean region has a high degree of diversity in political institutions, economic development stages and cultures and a high degree of complexity in international environment, so it is very difficult to realize the intra-regional economic integration. Despite great efforts have been made by the countries in the Indian Ocean region since last century, the economic integration in this region still shows following characteristics: intra-regional economies are not strongly independent and lack highly-developed intra-regional markets; intra-regional economies are limited by geographical scope and divided into several plates, which are featured by weak economic ties and lack of coordination among sub-regions and a generally lower degree of economic integration in each sub-region; the international economic cooperation mechanism in the Indian Ocean region shows low density and fragments and has limited effectiveness and development, and the established mechanisms lack the capability to economic cooperation and regional economic integration. That’s due to the similar trade structure of economies in the Indian Ocean region which lack complementarity, despite of different economic development degrees; on account of the weak manufacturing foundation of the whole region, it’s hard to develop the intra-regional production network; moreover, the supply and demand of regional economic cooperation institutions in the Indian Ocean region are hovering at a low level, so it is difficult to establish the overall institutional framework. So far, the Indian Ocean region also faces the impact of intervention of extra-regional powers, which poses a new challenge to the regional economic integration and the construction of economic cooperation mechanism in the Indian Ocean region.KeywordsRegional integrationEconomic integrationInternational mechanismInternational institutional arrangement

The article assesses China’s Indian Ocean strategy against the backdrop of its naval base development in Djibouti. It argues that China’s naval force posturing stems from a doctrinal shift to ocean-centric strategic thinking and is indicative of the larger gameplan of having a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s maritime strategy comprises four key components. First, to channel naval reinforcements for securing its maritime trade and economic interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—even as it strengthens the Maritime Silk Road initiative. Second, to develop logistical and operational capacities for a permanent far-seas presence, including preparedness for maritime combat and non-combat operations. Third, to undermine India’s geo-strategic influence in the IOR as the two lock into a near zero-sum game maritime competition. Fourth, to overcome the threat of US naval dominance and deter its coercive tactics by enhancing the costs of military conflict. Beijing’s ultimate objective is to emerge as a ‘global maritime power’ capable of commanding the far seas and oceans.

The Impeccable Incident is the latest in a long line of Chinese state actions by which the Chinese government is seeking to revise international law to legitimize coastal state authority to place limits on the freedom of navigation and overflight of foreign military vessels and aircraft in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In order to assess the current state of international law on this important practice, this chapter reviews regional state practice concerning foreign military activities in the EEZ. Observations about regional trends and practices are offered for the Indian Ocean and East Asian regions since they reflect the state activity in this area of the law. The chapter also reviews state practices concerning foreign military activities in the EEZ by region in order to develop a deeper sense of the motivations that inform trends in state practices. Keywords:East Asian region; exclusive economic zone (EEZ); Indian Ocean region; international law; military activities; state practice

Securing the Maritime Silk Road in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Nilanthi Samaranayake (bio) For roughly fifteen years, China's commercial and military activities in South Asia and the wider Indian Ocean have caused increasing concern about its intentions in the region. China specialists have examined the country's energy interests and naval planning along its sea lines of communication.1 The proliferation of commercial infrastructure projects now branded under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has heightened these concerns about China's presence in the Indian Ocean region. Prominent infrastructure efforts include port development in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, while lower-profile efforts include tunnel and bridge construction in Bangladesh and Maldives. These developments have raised questions about how China is attempting to secure the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—the waterway "road" component of BRI—in South Asia and across the Indian Ocean region more broadly. Because Pakistan will be examined by another essay in this roundtable and the China-Pakistan relationship is long-standing and predates BRI activities, this essay focuses on what China's activities look like elsewhere in maritime South Asia and out to critical Indian Ocean chokepoints. Despite notable changes in the country's presence in the Indian Ocean over the last decade, to what extent is China securing its commercial interests using naval and maritime forces? If it indeed aims to do this in a comprehensive way, then the results are modest at present. The first section of this essay examines the evidence that China is working to secure its interests in the region. The next section describes challenges to China's efforts to do so and the galvanizing effects of its activities thus far. The essay will conclude by emphasizing the importance of monitoring potential indicators of a substantive shift in the Indian Ocean and South Asian order, [End Page 21] despite the limited scope of China's activities to secure the MSR to date, and by considering the implications for U.S. interests in the region. Is China Securing the MSR? The clearest examples of China acting to secure the MSR are the counterpiracy and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) conducted by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and the establishment of a base in the far fringes of the Indian Ocean at the chokepoint in Djibouti. Since 2008, Beijing has sent a PLA Navy task force to the Gulf of Aden. Originating out of UN resolutions to combat piracy,2 China's military vessels have transited the Indian Ocean for the past decade, providing escort activity that aims to secure the safe passage of shipping, including for Chinese commercial vessels. China has used this mission to justify the deployment of submarines. These were clearly not in support of counterpiracy but instead appeared to be aimed at gaining operational experience far from home for this platform.3 As Admiral (ret.) Michael McDevitt observes, at any given time the PLA Navy has four to five surface ships and two support ships transiting the Indian Ocean, plus occasionally a submarine.4 India's chief of naval staff Admiral Sunil Lanba estimates a similar number (six to eight ships).5 Second, China conducted NEOs in response to domestic instability in Libya in 2011 and Yemen in 2015. In total, roughly 35,000 Chinese nationals were evacuated from Libya using Chinese civilian and military aircraft and ships,6 and nearly 1,000 Chinese and foreign nationals were evacuated from Yemen.7 Through such operations, China secured an important MSR asset—its citizens working in these countries. [End Page 22] Third, China established a military base in Djibouti in 2017. Although China had stated for decades that it had no intention of developing overseas bases, its counterpiracy operations as well as NEOs pointed to the potential benefits of having logistical support in place.8 The base leverages Djibouti's location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait chokepoint, where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden. China's presence at this far corner of the Indian Ocean shows the expanse of its operational reach across the region. Challenges to China Securing the MSR Through conducting counterpiracy operations and NEOs and establishing a base...

The Asian region has become the epicenter of global economic and geopolitical change. In this regard, the Pakistan Economic Corridor, ‘String of Pearls’ and the Maritime Silk Road in relation to the China Myanmar Economic Corridor are inclusive examples in this region. China has been trying to surround India in the Indian Ocean for a long time. In recent years, Chinese efforts have seen considerable upsurge. For this, it is working on a scheme called ‘String of Pearls’. To make the Indian Ocean a hub of trans-regional connectivity through several alternative routes. Despite China’s effectual interests in the Indian Ocean, its naval presence will particularly have a significant impact on the security of India and other major powers. However, as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Beijing’s strategic culture is more focused on self defense. Because the purpose of the ‘String of Pearls’ is to establish a Silk Road near the Indian Ocean region. There has been competition between India and China to find other such routes in the Indian Ocean region that could have a significant impact. The purpose of this article is to discuss China’s objectives, its approach to the Indian Ocean and its impact on India’s security measures to prevent it. Keywords: String of Pearls, Indian Ocean Region, India, China, Chinese.