Escenarios para el sometimiento de excluidos de Justicia y Paz a la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz: disquisición sobre sus ámbitos de aplicación

The following article discusses the development of Colombia’s paramilitary army, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), beginning in the 1990s and ending with the destruction of the organisation in the late 2000s. The AUC was originally founded by three brothers surnamed Castaño as a private army designed to combat the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and other Columbian revolutionary guerrilla groups. The main argument put forward in the article is that when the AUC was initially founded, the primary goal of its leaders, the Castaño brothers, was a sincere desire to check and, if possible, destroy the power of the FARC. In the process of its development however, the AUC came to depend on the taxation of cocaine to fund its war against the guerrillas. When the Colombian state, which had been too weak to prevent the development of either the AUC or the FARC in the 1990s, strengthened its military power in the 2000s, it demanded the AUC cease its operations, demobilise its military forces, and aid the state in destroying the cocaine industry’s infrastructure in southern Colombia. The Castaño brother who had become the organisation’s sole leader, Carlos, was willing to comply, but his move to end the AUC’s association with the cocaine industry invoked the wrath of his subordinate commanders, resulting in his brutal murder. This event revealed that the AUC had gradually developed into a cocaine cartel in the guise of a paramilitary army despite the intentions of its leader, who was killed because his leadership became a threat to the profitable taxation of cocaine that his former subordinate commanders enjoyed.

El presente trabajo tiene como propósito presentar un estudio breve sobre los tipos de penas por conductas ilegales que presenta el acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y la guerrilla de las FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo), para con ello dar evidencia de la posibilidad existente de desarrollar todo un modelo de sanción penal diferente a la institución de la cárcel tradicional que en la actualidad se presenta como una institución social en crisis. Para el desarrollo de dicho trabajo se abordará el texto en cinco momentos, siendo el primero una breve contextualización sobre la situación de conflicto armado y político en Colombia, pasando luego al panorama y situación de las cárceles, la argumentación teórica de la cárcel como una institución en crisis, la presentación somera del acuerdo de paz entre el gobierno colombiano y las FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo) en materia de justicia transicional, jurisdicción especial para la paz y las penas establecidas en el mismo para aquellas personas que participaron en el conflicto armado colombiano y finalmente las conclusiones del estudio.

BackgroundFollowing the 2016 Peace Agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia promised to reincorporate more than 13,000 guerrilla fighters into its healthcare system. Despite a subsidized healthcare insurance program and the establishment of 24 Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación (ETCRs—Territorial Spaces for Training and Reintegration) to facilitate this transition, data has shown that FARC ex-combatants access care at disproportionately lower rates, and face barriers to healthcare services.MethodsSemi-structured interviews were conducted with FARC health promoters and healthcare providers working in ETCRs to determine healthcare access barriers for FARC ex-combatants. Analysis was completed with a qualitative team-based coding method and barriers were categorized according to Julio Frenk’s Domains of Healthcare Access framework.ResultsAmong 32 participants, 25 were healthcare providers and 7 self-identified as FARC health promoters. The sample was majority female (71.9%) and worked with the FARC for an average of 12 months in hospital, health center, medical brigade, and ETCR settings. Our sample had experiences with FARC across 16 ETCRs in 13 Departments of Colombia. Participants identified a total of 141 healthcare access barriers affecting FARC ex-combatants, which affected healthcare needs, desires, seeking, initiation and continuation. Significant barriers were related to a lack of resources in rural areas, limited knowledge of the Colombian health system, the health insurance program, perceived stigma, and transition process from the FARC health system.ConclusionsFARC ex-combatants face significant healthcare access barriers, some of which are unique from other low-resource populations in Colombia. Potential solutions to these barriers included health insurance provider partnerships with health centers close to ETCRs, and training and contracting FARC health promoters to be primary healthcare providers in ETCRs. Future studies are needed to quantify the healthcare barriers affecting FARC ex-combatants, in order to implement targeted interventions to improve healthcare access.

With the Peace Agreement between Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Colombia promised healthcare to 13,000 ‘reincorporating’ FARC ex-combatants. Shortages of healthcare workers in reincorporation camps means this promise is in danger of going unfulfilled. More information is needed to determine incentives, disincentives, and recruitment of healthcare providers to address this shortage. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with healthcare providers across FARC reincorporation camps, and a multidisciplinary team conducted analysis in NVivo12 using a team-based coding method. Twenty-four healthcare professionals from 15 camps participated, of which 75% were female. Incentives to work with FARC included improved clinical skills, professional advancement, increased comfort with FARC, and contributing to the peace process. Disincentives included poor living conditions, lack of support, biases, familial commitments, and sacrificing career opportunities. Three-fourths of the sample recommended working with FARC, and 92% reported a shortage of healthcare workers. Recruitment strategies included improved resources and specialised career development for healthcare workers, facilitating interactions between FARC and healthcare professionals outside clinical scenarios, and integrating medicine for vulnerable populations into health education. This study shows the impact that working with FARC ex-combatants can have on healthcare providers and tangible suggestions for increasing provider participation to address the healthcare worker shortage.

Charles W. Bergquist (1942–2020)

This chapter considers the multiple efforts at engaging three armed groups in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARC]), the National Liberation Army (Ejercito Liberacion Nacional [ELN]), and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia [AUC]). I address the various demands for territorial and political control put forth by each of the two key rebel armed groups — the FARC and the ELN — as well as the efforts to either address those demands or simply recognize the security situation on the ground, and to reach cease-fires and engage in demobilization. This engagement appears to have failed, for various reasons, including the possibility that the incentives offered are not of significant interest to groups also engaged in the lucrative narcotics industry, or fearful of the heavy presence of the United States through Plan Colombia. Based on my fieldwork, carried out in summer 2006, I address the key concerns and objections of each armed group. Finally, although the umbrella group of right-wing paramilitaries, the AUC, has distinct historical origins and relations with the government, I address the demobilization of the AUC undertaken with the government’s guarantee of amnesty and a ‘concentration’ zone.

Nationalism, racism, violence, and militarism are incarnate in football itself, as indicated through an engagement with the history and theory of the sport. This chapter considers this context to question the identity of the state and who holds a monopoly on legitimate violence, through a case study of Colombia. It focuses on the 1980s and 1990s, an era dominated by putatively progressive guerrilla movements (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC), putatively unofficial right-wing paramilitares (the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or AUC), and putatively populist narcotraficantes/Mafiosi. One aspect was not entirely shared in their tripartite struggle against each other and the state over who could terrorize the population most—the narcos' involvement in football. For while state militarism occupies an important role in the mental map of Colombians, especially since US intervention from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama via "Plan Colombia", it has been largely absent from football, though institutional violence and its symbolism have not.

It is commonplace to say that Colombia is facing one of the longest armed conflicts to date (1964-2009). Today, Colombia has the second largest number of internally displaced people after Darfur, some four million, and one of the worst human rights records documented.1 This “new war,” to use Kaldor’s term,2 in which the distinctions between private/public, international/national, and combatant/civilian are blurred, has attracted the scholarly interest of political scientists and international relations and conflict studies scholars alike.3 What is not common, however, is to find scholars discussing the occurrence of genocide in Colombia. As I have argued elsewhere,4 however, genocide happened and is still ongoing today. Between 1985 and 2002, an entire political party, the Union Patriotica (UP), was annihilated in the midst of the 40-year Colombian armed conflict. The UP was a political front bringing together the Communist Party and other leftist and centrist political forces. It was the product of the Uribe Agreements between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), a MarxistLeninist oriented guerrilla movement, and the Colombian government in 1984. Although the UP was thought of as the means for the FARC to demobilize, the year itself seemed not to be the right moment for such a strategy. In fact, the UP was set up at a time of adverse conditions. Internationally, Reagan was carrying out his campaign against communism in order to defy the belief that the United States’ hegemony was declining.5 In Colombia itself, the counterinsurgency campaign led by the Colombian government had stepped up since 1981 when the army, drug traffickers, and governmental officials established a paramilitary group based in the Middle Magdalena Valley in order to defeat various guerrilla groups. This, together with the FARC’s own new (1982) strategy of government takeover, which meant a rise in kidnapping for ransom and ever more harassment of landowners and other sectors of the population in order to increase their finances, resulted in a degenerate war in which all the actors increasingly targeted non-combatants as a means of winning the war. In spite of these conditions, the UP was publicly launched in May 1985. According to some UP survivors, the assassination of civilians involved in the UP process started even before the official launch.6 It is estimated that, since 1985, between 3,000 and 5,000 of its members have been assassinated, hundredshave been disappeared, thousands displaced and many others rejected their UP affiliation so as to survive the violence.7 Over the last 20 years or so, different genocidal practices have brought down the social and political power of the UP resulting in its annihilation. Cepeda8 suggests that the UP genocide occurred in three phases: first, the weakening of organizational structures (1984-92), then, the coup de grâce phase that normalized its destruction (1992-2002), and finally, although the UP formally ceased to exist in Colombian politics in 2002 due to a lack of affiliates and support in the polls, the last stage is the destruction of the survivors which is, according to Cepeda, still ongoing today. This chapter is an attempt to explore some dynamics within the first period of the UP genocide. Given that the first stage of the genocide developed along with the international turmoil of the unexpected end of the Cold War, which saw, in the early 1980s, the re-emergence of the US crusade against communism, I pay special attention to the role that US-Colombian relations played in the development of the genocide. This analysis, I believe, demonstrates Grandin’s assertion that “the conception of democracy now being prescribed as the most effective weapon in the war on terrorism is itself largely, at least in Latin America, a product of terror.”9

FOCUS ❐ LATIN AMERICA According to the largest Colombian trade union centre - Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia / Central Union of Workers (CUT) – in 2013 there were 451 instances of anti-union violence – one act every 19 hours, every day of the year. The grim toll of Colombia’s war on trade unions amounts to at least 13,713 violations of the right to life and liberty since 1977 – 3062 assassinations, 233 kidnappings, 342 violent attacks, 6572 violent threats, 1890 forced displacements and 725 arbitrary detentions. Between 2000 and 2010, Colombia accounted for 63 percent of trade unionists murdered globally. The Colombian government has made significant effort to convince the international community they are taking steps to tackle anti-trade union violence, not least as part of their push to agree free trade agreements with the United States and the European Union. The Colombian government will often point to the protection measures provided by the state to many trade unionists - ranging from a bodyguard and a bullet-proof car, to a mobile phone or a bullet proof jacket - but the high impunity rate continues to give a green light for the assassinations to continue. Colombian organisations regularly point out that there often appears to be more time dedicated to investigating false accusations of trade unionist links to guerrilla organisations than to bringing those responsible for carrying out the murders to justice. The Labour Action Plan (LAP), was agreed in 2011 to demonstrate the commitment of the Colombian government to protect workers’ rights prior to the signing of the free trade agreement with the US – it has failed however to stop the killings. In the four years following the implementation of the LAP, more than 100 trade unionists were killed. And whilst the authorities assert that they are acting to apprehend the perpetrators, the evidence does not support this. A 2014 report by the CUT showed that 86.8 percent of assassinations remain in impunity, while 99.9 percent of threats are never investigated. The Colombian Trade Union Movement Trade union membership levels have taken a devastating hit as a direct result of the anti-union violence, anti-trade union laws and policies and massive labour market changes. In spite of these difficulties, the union movement continues to play an active role in Colombia: in 2013 and 2014, together with social organisations from across the country, the trade unions were involved in weeks of strikes and disruptions across Colombia in response to the devastating impact of international free trade agreements. Trade Union Rights in Colombia According to the largest Colombian trade union centre, in 2013 there were 451 instances of antiunion violence – one act every 19 hours INTERNATIONAL union rights Page 16 Volume 23 Issue 1 2016 T he trade union movement and the vast majority of social organisations in Colombia are currently giving their support to peace processes on-going between the government and the two left-wing guerrilla organisations, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia / Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional / National Liberation Army (ELN). There is hope that, if peace deals are reached that include measures for addressing the deep-rooted social and political inequalities, then an important step will have been taken towards improving the situation for workers, trade unionists and for all of those fighting for social transformation in Colombia. There are however considerable fears that the on-going lack of guarantees for political activists, including trade unionists, will provide a considerable obstacle to peace becoming a reality. Colombia has for several decades been the most dangerous place in the world to be a trade unionist. Every year numerous union leaders, union activists and union members are assassinated . Over 3000 trade unionists have been murdered since the mid-1970s, and nobody has been brought to justice in the vast majority of the cases. Over recent years, in spite of opening up of the peace talks and a more accepting discourse from Colombian government officials, the murders have not ceased. A recent Justice for Colombia report documented 534 political activists killed between 2011 and 2015 – this included 134 trade unionists. In addition to the violence, Colombia has some of the...

This work investigates how personalised Music Emotion Recognition (MER) systems may lead to sensitive profiling when applied to musically induced emotions in politically charged contexts. We focus on traditional Colombian music with explicit political content, including (1) vallenatos and social songs aligned with the left-wing guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and (2) corridos linked to sympathisers of the right-wing paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Using data from 49 participants with diverse political leanings, we train personalised machine learning models to predict induced emotional responses – particularly negative emotions. Our findings reveal that political identity plays a significant role in shaping emotional experiences of music with explicit political content, and that emotion recognition models can capture this variation to a certain extent. These results raise critical concerns about the potential misuse of emotion recognition technologies. What is often framed as a tool for wellbeing and emotional regulation could, in politically sensitive contexts, be repurposed for user profiling. This work highlights the ethical risks of deploying AI-driven emotion analysis without safeguards, particularly among populations that are politically or socially vulnerable. We argue that subjective emotional responses may constitute sensitive personal data, and that failing to account for their sociopolitical context could amplify harm and exclusion.Supplementary InformationThe online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1140/epjds/s13688-025-00595-1.

On 24 November 2016, the Colombian government and FARC-EP signed a historic peace agreement, establishing the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Recurrence. Central to this system is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (SJP), which combines restorative justice mechanisms with judicial oversight. This article analyses whether the special treatment measures under the SJP —such as special and alternative sanctions, amnesties, and pardons— comply with Colombia’s obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to investigate and punish serious human rights violations. It examines the proportionality and enforceability of these measures, highlighting their potential to conflict with international duties if not properly implemented. While the SJP’s approach may facilitate peace, it must ensure that the System’s sanctions align with the gravity of crimes committed. This study underscores the need for Colombia’s transitional justice framework to uphold victims’ rights while adhering to international standards. Received: 10 May 2024 Accepted: 31 March 2025 Articles in Press: 15 April 2025

Made in Havana: How Colombia and the FARC Decided to End the War

The participation of children in war doesn’t begin from modern times, and it could be traced back from the civilization of ancient Egypt, ancient Greece and the Bible. Any country, which is facing a long-timed war, its troops is going to be exhausted, and during that time it will often recruit children to get into the battlefield. According to interpretation of child soldiers of UNICEF and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, children who are under the age of 18, participate in any regular or irregular armed groups, including combatants, bombers of mines, baits, logistics, porters, sentries, spies, messengers, cooks, laborers and some of them are forced into the marriage with the commander or to be bodyguards and shields for the commander. Colombia is currently the only country of Latin American which has civil war. Since Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia was founded in 1964, the problem of guerrilla already existed for nearly 50 years, it’s estimated that about 20 million people died in the armed conflict between Colombia government, the guerrillas and paramilitary. It’s originated from ideological differences and the Colombian internal conflict, and things could be different as time goes by that it finally became the struggle territorial control. Nearly 40 percent of territory in Colombia has controlled by the guerrillas. In Colombia, children who are under 18 years old have to face many challenges in their daily lives. As a result of armed conflict, children forced migration, displacement, kidnapping and get involved with street retaliatory war and military crackdown. The biggest threat is forced to become child soldiers on the battlefield. In Latin America, Colombia is estimated that about 11,000 to 14,000 children get involved with the war between in left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary and government army. Making child soldiers to reintegrate into society is a complicated and long-term issue. The United Nations and NGOs over the world spare no efforts to alleviate poverty, improve education and employment opportunities, and establish pipeline for children to participate in the development of regions and countries. These efforts are trying to achieve a future of peace and security which are indispensable.

Las víctimas han adquirido una legitimidad social y política inédita en el mundo contemporáneo. A la luz de dicho fenómeno y los debates que ha generado en las ciencias sociales y humanas, en este artículo analizamos cómo se construye la identidad de víctima en Bojayá, un municipio del litoral pacífico colombiano donde fueron masacradas más de ochenta personas en 2002 durante un combate entre las FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo) y las AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). Apoyados en entrevistas y datos de campo, argumentamos que el trauma social de la masacre y el sufrimiento son el motor de la agencia política de las víctimas y el medio que les permite devenir sujetos políticos. A partir de conceptos del psicoanálisis lacaniano, concluimos que la nominación de víctima en Bojayá posibilita que sus habitantes —antes invisibilizados— existan para el Otro de la nación y del escenario internacional.

The kidnapping of the presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt in February 2002 by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the numerous attempts to free her, by force or through negotiations, have made the headlines. Three US citizens, who are US Defense Department contractors, were also caught by FARC after their plane came down during a surveillance mission in February 2003. Hope was on the rise again as to their freedom when the re-elected President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe, announced in 2006 he would resume talks for prisoners/hostages exchanges. However, the negotiations took an abrupt end after a bombing in Bogota in October 2006.2 In 2007 a hostage escaped after spending nine years held by the movement. More recently, President Chavez tried to act as an intermediary to have all FARC’s prisoners released. However, it seems today that the Uribe government seems less inclined to engage in peace talks and seems ready to interfere violently to free the other hostages, despise the hostages’ families’ fears of a bloodbath.3 The question remains as to how a peaceful solution can be found to the hostage crisis, knowing that it is diffi cult for a government to negotiate with a group that mixes violence and politics in order to rise to power. FARC has demonstrated in the past it cannot be trusted when it is given the opportunity to act as a political actor during negotiations and peace talks, as it has abused the situation. The successive Colombian governments have chosen a politics of repression of the movement that has also crushed all hopes of transformation of FARC into a political machine. What, therefore, are the prospects for peace in Colombia and how are they linked to FARC’s insertion in political life?