Epistemological Modesty within Contemporary Political Thought

Abstract

Listen

Translate article

In this paper, I expound Philip Pettit’s political thought as an example of a ‘spontaneous and naturalistic’ view of politics and place his account within a liberal tradition of epistemological modesty which Pettit imagines he has transcended. To this end, I highlight the affinities between Pettit’s theory of freedom and a paradigmatically ‘modest’ social theory, namely, Hayek’s theory of the spontaneous social order. In light of the comparison with Hayek, I show that Pettit’s distinction between liberal and republican thought is not as vivid as he suggests. My contention is that the republican ideal of freedom offers not so much the makings of a viable non-liberal theory of political association as the expression, under a ‘new’ language of citizenship, of specifically Hayekian intuitions that lie at the core of contemporary neoliberalism.