Abstract
I characterize epistemic trust as an intellectual virtue of a responsibilist kind. I argue that an agent H places epistemic trust in agent S that p if and only if: (1) H takes S to communicate that p; (2) H believes that p; (3) H depends upon S’s (perceived) communication for H’s belief that p; (4) H sees S as epistemically authoritative with respect to p; and (5) H is confident that S will not purposefully lie about p. The virtuous epistemic truster does all the above while also being skilled at judging when it is epistemically appropriate to trust, motivated to trust out of a desire for epistemic goods, and competent at the characteristic activity of epistemic trust. Having classified epistemic trust as a virtue, I highlight its tremendous epistemic value in the age of misinformation. Today, although we have access to an ocean of information at the click of a button, we can fall victim to fake news, rumors, and echo chambers. Thus, it is critical that we are able to discern who to trust, when to trust them, and about which epistemic goods.
Published Version
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