Environmental pollution and officials' promotion: How China's green attention matters

Abstract

With the growing emphasis on sustainable development, green policies have become a crucial factor influencing both environmental pollution and the career progression of officials in China and other countries. However, the mechanisms behind this relationship remain unclear. This paper aims to enhance the understanding of how environmental pollution impacts official promotion by analyzing the performance of provincial leaders in China and their incentives to address pollution. Using provincial panel data from 1998 to 2020 and a probit model, our study uncovers significant findings. We demonstrate that the intensified green attention by China's central government has notably reduced the promotion prospects for provincial officials with poor environmental protection records, particularly since 2013. Furthermore, our research extends the analysis of micro-level mechanisms, illustrating how the central government's political incentives effectively influence local environmental governance. This study underscores the central government's capability to leverage its personnel system to achieve desired outcomes in sustainable development.