(Decentralization and Budgetary Autonomy: On the Local Budgetary Autonomy under the Revenue-Sharing System and Its Constitutional Implication)

Abstract

Chinese Abstract: 地方财政预算权是地方分权的核心内容，决定了地方政府能否自主地治理，并对中央的权力形成有效制衡，因此，其变迁具有深远的宪政意涵。从《预算法》文本上看，作为整体意义上的地方政府拥有了一定的预算自主权，但是在当下中国的法律和政治实践中，该项自主权的实质范围如何、受到何种来自中央的限缩抑或自身如何扩张，则是纵向分权上的重大问题，本文正围绕这一核心问题展开.本文首先梳理并重构地方预算自主权这一概念的内涵，由此建立起一个的新分析框架。由于我国地方预算自主权是在分税制改革的背景下形成的，本文回顾了分税制改革前我国地方财政权力收放的历史，以及改革后形成的“收入集权、支出分权”的央地财政分权模式.之后，本文结合法律文本和政治实践，通过对地方预算自主权的内容进行细致的分项分析，将目前地方预算的自主程度概括为“预算程序地方分权，预算收入中央集权，预算支出地方部分分权”。在这一框架下，主要的地方预算收入和支出决策权仍保留于中央，地方只有执行权和有限的决策权，中央集权的特征仍然明显，加之转移支付制度尚不够完善，造成了目前基层地方政府普遍的财政困境和预算不自主的现状.最后，本文剖析指出，地方预算自主权不足的根源，不仅在于财政宏观调控体系背后的中央优越性假设，也在于单一制国家结构形式下中央掌握着权力收放的最终决定权，以及地方政府欠缺在中央层面的政治参与权.如欲真正增强地方预算的自主权，靠技术化的预算改革难以解决这一问题，而需要对央地之间的纵向宪政权力架构作出改革，使中央和地方关系走向权力配置法治化、府际纠纷解决制度化，并保障地方在中央的政治参与权和规范化的利益表达渠道、充实地方人大的自治权力，最终从“单中心”的中央集权体制逐步走向“多中心”的地方自治.（本文刊载于《行政法论丛》2016年第18卷和《中国公共预算研究（第五届学术会议论文集）》（2014 · 北京），中央编译出版社2016年版，并获2016年蔡定剑宪法学优秀论文奖提名奖。）English Abstract: The vertical decentralization between central and local government is a key element of a state’s constitutional structure. Meanwhile, the local fiscal and budgetary autonomy is the central outcome of decentralization, which determines whether a local government could rule autonomously and forms an effective check and balance on the central government’s power. Therefore, the transition in local budgetary autonomy bears a profound constitutional implication. To some extent, the Chinese Budget Law has authorized budgetary autonomy to the local governments as a whole. However, it remains unclear that in China’s current legal and political practice, what is the substantial scope of this autonomy? How is it restricted by the central government? How does it endeavor to expend actively? These significant questions are closely related with the constitutional decentralization between central and local governments. This article is built around these central questions.In the beginning, this article systemizes and reconstructed the connotation of the concept “local budgetary autonomy”, on which a novel analyzing framework is based. As the local budgetary autonomy in China was formed in the context of Revenue-Sharing System Reform, this article reviewed the history of China’s local fiscal power before the reform, and the fiscal model of “centralized revenue, decentralized expenditure” between the central and local governments. The aim of the reform is to strengthen the central government’s fiscal extractive capacity, and to give some freedom in fiscal expenditure to the local governments. A transfer-payment-centered local fiscal and budgetary system is thus formed, and its process of funds flow can be concluded as “(local government) collecting tax -- (local government) turning over its revenue -- (central government’s) transfer payment”. These characteristics have profound influence on the development of local budgetary power.Based on the legal texts and political practice, this article then analyzed each branch of the local budgetary autonomy in detail (procedural budgetary autonomy, budgetary revenue autonomy and budgetary expenditure autonomy), and concluded the current local status as follows: the procedural budgetary autonomy is decentralized, the budgetary revenue autonomy is highly centralized, and the budgetary expenditure autonomy is half-decentralized. Under this framework, the main decision-making power of local budgetary revenue and expenditure still belongs to the central government, and the local governments merely have the executive power. Therefore, the whole fiscal and budgetary system is still highly centralized. In addition, there are many drawbacks of the transfer payment system. As a result, it is quite common that the local governments are facing fiscal troubles and lacking in budgetary autonomy.Finally, this article analyzed the root cause of local budgetary autonomy, and puts forward its solution in constitutional reform. After the Revenue-Sharing System reform, the transfer payment regime has been the central part of local fiscal and budgetary system, of which the underlying logic is that, it is more efficient that the central government controls local governments’ fiscal structure by means of the transfer payment system than the local fiscal self-government, because the central government can reduce the financial fluctuation and the economic development unbalancedness among local governments. This logic has determined that the general design of revenue-sharing system and transfer payment reform is inclined to be centralized, which is the root cause of the insufficient in local budgetary autonomy and has a great impact on local governments budgetary power. To strengthen the local budgetary autonomy, the state should conduct a profound reform on its vertical constructional structure instead of a technical one. This constitutional reform should legalize the central-local relations, apply judicial methods to solve central-local conflicts, empower the autonomous power of local People’s Congress and ensure that local governments have political participation right in central government. The ultimate goal is to realize the transition from a “unicentric” centralized constitutional system to a “polycentric” decentralized one.