Abstract

The development of environmental regulatory policy in the United States during recent years has been marked by the widespread participation and influence of what we shall term as an acronymn for Citizen Interest Groups.' The activities of such groups have frequently benefited from significant forms of public financial subvention, particularly through preferential tax treatment. Part I of this paper surveys the benefits of preferential tax legislation as they apply to the environmentalist CIG. Part II assesses the restrictions prerequisite to such preferential treatment. Finally, part III provides a brief commentary on the appropriateness of the legal treatment from the viewpoint of political economy. Our results suggest that, although the preferential treatment available to environmentalist CIGs is of substantial value, the political restrictions attached to such treatment have probably not cost the CIGs any substantial reduction in their impact on policy. We do, however, find cause to entertain reservations about certain aspects of the current tax treatment of the environmentalist groups.

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