Abstract
I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious
Highlights
The first is a pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities
The PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science
Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists
Summary
Engaging Philosophically with the History of Science: Two Challenges for Scientific Realism* I would like to raise two challenges for scientific realists. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary 
Published Version (
Free)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call