Abstract

Abstract This article deals with a case study from competition policy and decartelization in West Germany in the early to mid 1950 s. Whereas much research has focused on the discussions about the German cartel law of 1958 and its long process of formation, this article takes a closer look at the possibilities that Ludwig Erhard and his Ministry of Economics already had under the Allied Laws of 1947 that remained in place until 1957. This is demonstrated by a case study about the soap cartel of 1954/55. While Erhard and most of his civil servants were aware that this cartel would not be able to solve the soap industry’s problems, they still decided to push the Allied authorities towards approving it to demonstrate the inadequacy of cartelization. Thereby, they dealt a blow to those leaders of industry associations arguing against a strict ban on cartels. One of Erhard’s most influential opponents, Fritz Berg, had praised the soap cartel, which allowed more internal competition than simple price fixing cartels, as a model for future cartels and an example proving the disadvantages of a flat-out cartel ban. By letting the cartel fail under the conditions of a rapidly modernizing market instead of banning it, Erhard dealt a major blow to Berg’s argument. This way, Berg and his allies could not blame the failure of the soap industry on decartelization.

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