Scientific Advice and Administrative Traditions: The Role of Chief Scientists in Climate Change Adaptation

Abstract

The role of the chief scientist (CS), a key administrative position in various Israeli ministries, is to fund policy-oriented research and support evidence-based decision-making. Has the CS's role promoted or constrained incorporation of scientific advice regarding climate change adaptation into governmental policy? Have administrative traditions affected the adaptation planning process in Israel? Analysis of documents and 26 in-depth interviews with key stakeholders sheds light on the ongoing climate change adaptation policy formulation process. Our study reveals that the CS of the Ministry of Environmental Protection functions as a bridge at different interfaces and can be characterized as a boundary worker between institutions. The inherent independence of this position facilitates the CS's ability to initiate, foster, and prioritize complex issues such as adaptation. Our findings further suggest that the perception that Israel has already adapted, or will easily adapt, has negatively affected the adaptation process. 首席科学家是以色列各部门的一个关键行政职务, 其具体作用是为政策性研究提供资金, 并支持循证决策。对于有关气候变化适应的科学建议, 首席科学家的作用是促进还是限制了其被纳入到政府政策中？行政传统是否影响了以色列的气候适应规划进程？通过文件分析及与关键利益相关者的26次深入访谈, 笔者揭示了正在进行的适应气候变化政策的制定过程。研究表明, 环保部门的首席科学家在不同的层面上起着桥梁作用, 在不同机构的分界线上工作以彼此连接。该职位的内在独立性能促进首席科学家在发起问题、培养和优先考虑包括适应气候等复杂问题的能力。研究进一步表明, 以色列已经适应了或即将轻易适应某些观点, 而这已经对气候适应过程产生了负面影响。 El papel que juegan los científicos principales, un puesto administrativo clave en varios ministerios israelíes, está específicamente designado para el financiamiento de investigación orientada hacia la política y el apoyo a decisiones basadas en evidencia. ¿El papel que juegan los científicos principales ha promovido o limitado la incorporación de asesoría científica en lo que concierne a la adaptación al cambio climático dentro de las políticas del gobierno? ¿Las tradiciones administrativas han afectado el proceso de planeación para la adaptación en Israel? El análisis de los documentos en 26 entrevistas exhaustivas con partes afectadas clave ilustra el proceso de formulación de las políticas de adaptación al cambio climático actual. Nuestro estudio revela que el Científico Principal del Ministerio de Protección Ambiental funciona como un puente para diferentes interfaces y puede ser caracterizado como un trabajador limítrofe entre las instituciones. La independencia inherente de esta posición facilita la habilidad del científico principal para iniciar, fomentar y darle prioridad a complejos problemas como la adaptación. Nuestros hallazgos sugieren que la percepción de Israel ya se ha adaptado, o se adaptará fácilmente, y ha afectado negativamente el proceso de adaptación. Public administrators face many challenges when dealing with the complex issue of climate change adaptation (Termeer, Dewulf, & Breeman, 2013). Scholars have long documented how national political cultures, regulatory styles, or administrative traditions, broadly defined as sets of institutionalized norms and procedures, have influenced policy responses to complex global problems (Halffman, 2005; Howlett, 2014; Peters, 2018; Wellstead, Howlett, & Rayner, 2017). Administrative traditions vary among countries and over time. They partly explain political decisions and policy choices and, therefore, are also expected to influence climate change adaptation strategies (Biesbroek, Peters, & Tosun, 2018). Scientific advice is an important element within the context of administrative traditions. Debates over how scientific advice enters the government or how science-policy boundaries are organized have received increased scholarly attention (Brugger, Meadow, & Horangic, 2016; Craft & Wilder, 2017). Advisory processes within the government often rely on scientists to provide guidance to decision-makers (Jasanoff, 1990). Administrative traditions affect the way public bureaucrats use their sources of advice and how policy makers assess knowledge that is often very unfamiliar to them. Since information is transferred to politicians by bureaucrats, the latter's processing of the information for use by others is important. Furthermore, in certain administrative traditions, scientists themselves hold a position in the administration and may also advocate for preferred outcomes (Craft & Howlett, 2013; Pielke, 2007). In this article, we focus on the role of chief scientists (CSs) in the Israeli government and, in particular, in the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MoEP). In recent years, the CS of the MoEP has been leading an interministerial committee to draft a national climate change adaptation plan. We investigated if and how administrative traditions affect the adaptation planning process, focusing on the ability of the CS—as a boundary worker—to incorporate scientific advice about climate change adaptation into governmental policy. Previous studies assessing administrative traditions usually focused on established Western democracies in Europe and North America or post-Soviet or post-colonial states (Painter & Peters, 2010; Verheijen, 2007). Israel, other small or young countries, as well as African states (Vink & Schouten, 2018) are often overlooked. Research characterizing current adaptation strategies “remains in its infancy” (Ford et al., 2015, p. 801). Israel's experience in developing a national adaptation policy may contribute to a better understanding of other countries, especially non-Annex I states, that were not required to meet international commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In Israel, the ideal policy maker is characterized by a capacity to improvise and an ability to make the most of limited and available means, rather than being guided by rationality and planned action (Sharkansky & Zalmanovitch, 2000). Interestingly, this distinctive administrative tradition also permeates the organizational bureaucracy in general. According to Menahem and Zehavi (2016, p. 175), Israel has inherited two opposing administrative traditions: on the one hand is the “civil servants' tradition of political neutrality and professional norms, which was developed over the years by the British Colonial Office”; while on the other hand is the Jewish Zionist agency tradition which is characterized by improvisation and undisguised political activism (Menahem & Zehavi, 2016). While administrations around the world have begun adopting policies regarding climate change, particularly in efforts to mitigate its effects (Nachmany et al., 2015; Tobin, Schmidt, Tosun, & Burns, 2018), and, increasingly also, have combined approaches of mitigation and adaptation (Fleig, Schmidt, & Tosun, 2017), most countries still have not yet comprehensively implemented these policies (Lesnikowski, Ford, Biesbroek, Berrang-Ford, & Heymann, 2016; Wellstead et al., 2017). The Paris Agreement, which Israel ratified in 2016, directs countries to respond to climate change nationally by taking both mitigation and adaptation measures. Thus far, Israeli policy makers have struggled to translate implications arising from climate change into domestic policies, let alone legislation (Michaels & Tal, 2015). Israel's relatively slow progress regarding mitigation and adaptation is puzzling, especially considering the many local technological innovations that support adaptation and that have been transferred worldwide. Due to the country's lack of economic and natural resources, arid climate, and long-lasting water crisis, Israel has developed technological solutions for drylands adaptation, including seawater desalination, drip irrigation, and solar-thermal technologies (Erdan, 2009; Ministry of Economy, 2015; Teschner, Garb, & Paavola, 2013). Yet a comprehensive adaptation policy, which takes into account future impacts and cross-sector synergies, has not yet been adopted. Our study attempts to shed light on the role of the CS in the ongoing climate change adaptation policy formulation process based on analysis of government documents and in-depth interviews we conducted with key stakeholders. In the first section, we examine how scientific knowledge enters bureaucracy and discuss key concepts pertinent to the science–policy interface and administrative traditions. We then describe the origins and tasks of Israeli CSs and present an overview of climate change adaptation measures in Israel. The subsequent section outlines our data sources and methodology. Finally, we present the results of the thematic analysis of 26 interviews, followed by a discussion of our main findings and conclusions. In this section, we investigate the interplay of national administrative traditions with climate change adaptation policy, paying particular attention to the significant body of literature on the role of advisory systems and boundary workers in policy-making processes. The practice of using scientific expertise in public administration is by no means a new one. Bureaucrats regularly rely on scientific knowledge to shape policy (Jasanoff & Wynne, 1998; Page, 2012). Much of the literature on scientific knowledge and government has, therefore, primarily involved debates on how to best integrate expertise into decision-making processes (Brugger et al., 2016; Himsworth, 1980; Sarewitz, 2004). Due to their complexity, environmental issues are perhaps the most challenging science-informed decisions to tackle, often considered “wicked problems” and characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, controversies, interdependency, and conflicting interests (Dryzek, 1987; Sandler, 1997; Termeer et al., 2013). Climate change adaptation is further confined by social perceptions of risks, values, ethics, and culture, as well as different levels of vulnerability (Adger, Lorenzoni, & O'Brien, 2009; Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010; Pelling, 2010), which, again, scientific postulates alone cannot solve. As a result, policy makers' heavy reliance on scientific models to identify, understand, or communicate potential solutions to climate change adaptation is sometimes viewed as an impediment to policy formulation and decision-making (Biesbroek, Klostermann, Termeer, & Kabat, 2013). Such challenges contribute to the fact that policies, especially in the field of adaptation, remain poorly developed in many countries (Araos, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Biesbroek, & Moser, 2017; Wellstead et al., 2017). The question of who brings scientific expertise into the government and under which constraints they operate is also important. Biesbroek and others (2018) discuss the link between knowledge gathering of civil servants and administrative traditions in the context of adaptation in great detail. Rahman and Tosun (2018) further show, for example, how national project directors play an important role in implementing and managing adaptation projects in the administration of Bangladesh. Bureaucrats are very often faced with numerous constraints; exercising their mandate to advise politicians means navigating between what should be done and what can be done (Page, 2012). Scholarly evidence, however, indicates that the scientific expertise of bureaucrats does not automatically translate into the ability to influence policy processes. On the contrary, public administrators with policy experience are much more active in recommending and actually developing legislation (Page, 2010). Translating is the key function of bureaucrats working in the science–policy interface (Hoppe, 2010). The challenge facing bureaucrats dealing with climate change is often how to translate their efforts into action (Hoppe, 2010). This is why scholars have raised a need for “climate science integrators” (Jacobs, Garfin, & Lenart, 2005) or “boundary workers” (Brugger et al., 2016). The idea is that boundary workers not only participate in the process of developing applicable science, but also have developed a favorable set of skills for putting policy into practice (Brugger et al., 2016). For example, boundary workers need to communicate and sustain relationships with scientists from different fields, various decision-makers in government and industry, and also stay in touch with practitioners and the public (Jacobs et al., 2005; Lemos & Morehouse, 2005). In addition, civil servants rely on their traditional disciplinary training (Brugger et al., 2016) and previous professional experiences (Christensen & Lægreid, 2008). However, difficulties can arise when different departments within government play by their own rules or have specific needs (Geerlings & Stead, 2003). Negev (2015) illustrates how personas and individual efforts of bureaucrats are crucial in enabling governmental interagency collaborations, especially in countries with relatively low policy integration, such as Israel. An administrative tradition that fosters cross-sector coordination is therefore all the more important (Persson et al., 2018). Special institutions for integrating science and political decision-making exist across various policy contexts and levels (Arimoto & Sato, 2012; Gallopin, Funtowicz, O'Connor & Ravetz, 2001; Guston, 1999; Jasanoff, 1990; Reinecke, 2015). In the United Kingdom, for example, advisory systems are embedded inside the government (Holmes & Clark, 2008) and the government chief scientific advisor directly advises the prime minister regarding risk and resilience, energy, and climate change (Government Office for Science, 2015). In the federal structure of Germany as well, every provincial state has its own governmental division and bureaucrats who deal with environmental and special technical aspects of climate change. In contrast, advisors for climate change issues in Finland are part of the Finnish Environment Institute which is an independent agency outside of the government. The following section situates the role of scientific advisors in the Israeli administration based on our analysis of relevant government documents and protocols. In Israel, in 1966 the Kachalsky Committee for the Organization and Administration of Government Research recommended creating CS positions in relevant ministries to coordinate research and technology activities and to stimulate applied research. In its early years of existence, Israel relied heavily on foreign expertise (Leck, Lemarchand, & Tash, 2016), and the committee's main conclusions were that there is a solid foundation for research at local universities, but no satisfactory mechanism to apply this academic-based knowledge in the industry or government (Keynan, 1988). The first scientific advisor in governmental ministries was in the Ministry of Defense (Keynan, 1998), but the first official CS was positioned in the Ministry of Economy in order to prioritize and fund civil research and development (R&D), mainly through research grants (Teubal, 1983).1 Discussions over the extent and nature of the CS's independence took place during the successive years. A Governmental Decision from 2001 (no. 2895/MT/16) stated that “a CS must be a senior scientist recognized and accepted by the scientific community, who is active as a researcher in the field relevant to the activities of his office, and has authority and jurisdiction in his area of expertise. The CS will be able to bridge between academia and other factors involved in R&D” (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). A report from a public investigation committee a decade later found, however, that “in contrast to the original intention, in some of the ministries, several appointees for the CS positions were not academics or researchers” (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). The committees also found that there was a lack of uniformity and clarity regarding the qualifications required for the CS position in the various ministries (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). CSs are usually external to the bureaucracy and are recruited from universities or the industry sector (e.g., the current CS at the Ministries of Environmental Protection and Transport), appointed to directly advise cabinet members of the respective ministries (Keynan, 1988), but it also happens that she or he are appointed from within the administrative structure of the ministry (e.g., a former CS at the MoEP). CS positions have developed over the years in almost all executive ministries, such as the Ministries of Economy, Science and Technology, Agriculture, and Environmental Protection. In 2011, twelve CSs were employed by government ministries (15 ministries did not have one), but the number declined in 2016 to only nine (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). Depending on their responsibilities, CSs have varying sizes of staff and budgets in the office they head. For instance, the Office of the CS in the MoEP has five permanent and three temporary staff positions and a budget of nearly 1.7 million euros. In contrast, the CSs in the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy oversee a much higher budget, approximately 23 million and 11 million euros, and have eight and twelve staff positions, respectively (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). The length of employment of a CS can vary as well, and sometimes ministries opt not to employ a CS for a certain period as was the case, for example, in the Ministry of Transportation from 1979 to 1994. Following a governmental decision on this topic, however, most CSs today are appointed for 4 years with the option of extending their contract for another 4 years.2 CSs play a critical role in the interface of science, policy, and politics in Israel. First, they are responsible for setting research priorities, publishing calls for proposals, evaluating them, and administering research funds. Second, they provide in-house scientific advice to the minister, the director general, and departments within the ministry, thereby supporting decision-making (NCRD, 2014). CSs also foster international scientific collaborations and each office may decide upon additional priorities. The CS's activities at the MoEP regarding climate change adaptation include preparing for and participating in the Conferences of the Parties under the UNFCCC, supporting the Israeli Climate Change Information Center (ICCIC) established in 2011, and raising awareness regarding environmental issues (Chief Scientist Office, 2015). Furthermore, the CS leads an interministerial Director Generals Committee created to prepare a national adaptation plan. This task was officially assigned to the CS of the MoEP by Government Decision 474 in 2009. It details which entities should take part in the process, including twelve ministries, among them the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Energy, in addition to representatives of local authorities and NGOs. Other relevant organizations may also be invited to participate (Government of Israel, 2009b). In summary, the R&D governance in Israel is decentralized and each ministry is responsible for R&D in its own sector. Working in a bureaucratic–political environment, rather than an academic one, poses numerous challenges for CSs who are mandated to translate scientific knowledge, advise, and support regulation in multiple fields (Knesset Research and Information Center, 2016). We further discuss these complexities below following a brief review of the effects of climate change on Israel. Israel faces numerous ecological challenges. Most likely, Israel will become hotter and drier through increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events resulting from climate change, specifically heat waves as well as continued decline in rainfall leading to droughts (Drobinski et al., 2016; Michaels & Alpert, 2013). Generally, the entire region (Israel, Palestinian Authority, and Jordan) is extremely vulnerable and predicted to experience an increase in the average temperature of 1°C, which lies above the global warming rate (Givati, 2016). Water is an extremely scarce resource in the country, with 75% of the available freshwater reserved for domestic, agricultural, and industrial use. Israel has addressed water shortages through the development of desalinated water (80% of drinking and industrial demand in 2017) and agriculture-related technologies (Israeli Water Authority, 2017; Ministry of Economy, 2015). Yet some argue that any change in Israel's rainfall pattern will have major implications for the country that might also be trans-boundary in nature in a geopolitically volatile region (Feitelson, Tamimi, & Rosenthal, 2012; Teschner et al., 2013). Climate change will also impact Israel through a second channel: Israel will likely be affected by floods and a rise in the sea level, albeit to a lesser extent (ICCIC, 2011). A study, for example, found that Tel-Aviv is one of the top 15 coastal cities most likely to be affected by climate change worldwide (Hallegatte, Green, Nicholls, & Corfee-Morlot, 2013). This is particularly worrisome as the country has a population density of 387.2 persons per km2, with the majority of residents living in cities along the coast. The population growth rate was 2% in 2016 (World Bank, 2017), a very high rate compared with the EU's annual average of 0.13% (OECD, 2017). As part of the long process of drafting recommendations for the official adaptation plan, the ICCIC was established in 2011 and mandated to produce research and policy recommendations in seven main fields: climatic changes, public health, water, biodiversity, urban planning and building, economy, and geostrategic implications (ICCIC, 2014). The center consisted of scientists from Israeli universities and was budgeted for the years 2011–13. Since then it did not receive additional funding. During this period, three reports were produced. The first report gathers existing knowledge regarding the implications of climate change on the State of Israel (ICCIC, 2011). The second report focuses on the proposed national adaptation policy in relevant areas and details possibilities of international marketing for the ICCIC (Shechter et al., 2012). The third and final report specifically addresses the local level of government and adaptation to climate change in the local authorities (Ayalon et al., 2013). These reports identified research and knowledge gaps in the abovementioned sectors so they could lay the foundations for the national adaptation plan. Thus far, the Israeli government has not enacted an official adaptation policy; currently, a full draft of recommendations for the national plan, as well as a resolution to adapt, has been written and is circulating among ministries. The resolution acknowledges that Israel needs to adapt, and the national adaptation plan envisions that each ministry will submit an annual progress report on its preparation for climate change (INT 6, 2017). To investigate the role of CSs and examine their influence on climate change adaptation policy in the Israeli administrative system, in addition to a document analysis of government protocols and policy papers, we conducted elite interviews (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002) with relevant stakeholders. Scholars agree that gathering data from those directly involved in the daily process (Gläser & Laudel, 2010) is useful because expert judgments can identify key actors. Hence, in seeking to understand the inner workings of Israeli CSs with regards to the national climate change adaptation plan, semistructured interviews helped to reconstruct the process (Anfara, Brown, & Mangione, 2002). In total, we conducted 26 interviews, the majority of them face-to-face, between 2016 and 2017 (for a detailed list of the interviewees' affiliations see the Appendix). The sample consists of current and past CSs, senior staff members of CS offices, as well as Israeli academics and NGO representatives—all of whom have had long-term experience with aspects of climate change and many of whom participated in the national drafting process. They were able to offer insights regarding the role of a CS and the use of scientific advice in policy making in general, and in adaptation policy in particular. The diversity of the interviewees helped to control for subjective influences of individuals, adding validity to our primary data set (Flick, von Kardoff, Steinke, & Jenner, 2004). With the consent of all interviewees, notes were taken during the interviews and the recorded audio files were transcribed subsequently with the transcription software f5. The transcriptions were compared and interpreted qualitatively using MAXQDA software, which enables structuring and organization of large quantities of data as well as the construction of coding schemes. We employed the qualitative thematic analysis approach to identify and analyze emerging themes from detailed and complex data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In seeking to identify these themes, we coded the interviews in an inductive manner using the grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In the first reading of the interview material, codes were created and then redefined at subsequent stages of the coding development. In determining patterns, thematic analysis enables identification of commonalities and determination of repetitive themes across interviews. The fact that codes change throughout the process is common (MacQueen, McLellan, Kay, & Milstein, 1998). At later stages, the analysis consisted of fine-tuning our coding until novel aspects no longer surfaced (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Coding of the data ended when we reached saturation—that is, once further analysis did not result in new codes or in the additional fine-tuning of existing codes. At this stage, codes were clustered into themes. In this section, we present a detailed overview of the four prominent themes that emerged from the interviews. To better understand the contribution and constraints of boundary workers, such as CSs, we will concentrate on the role of the CS in the MoEP and its relationship with other actors involved in the national adaptation plan in Israel. The results also help address our question as to how administrative traditions have affected the adaptation process in the country. In Israel, CSs are characterized by their interactions inside and outside of their ministry. The constant interaction between various interfaces makes the role of the CS at the MoEP collaborative and participatory in nature. The CS bridges between (1) science and policy through support of and collaboration with academic research conducted at universities; (2) government and the public sphere, for example, engagement with NGOs; (3) governmental sectors (various ministries); and (4) governmental levels (local–national). In the following, we detail the four abovementioned interfaces and the boundary-spanning activities undertaken by the CS at the MoEP (see also Figure 1 below). The CS of the MoEP as a Bridge Between Institutions A recurring theme was the science–policy interface and the CS's function as a bridge between the science and policy arenas. Several interviewees, including current and former CSs, perceived that the CS's role mediated scientific advice about current issues to other policy actors. Interviewees noted in particular that collaborations between the CS and scientists from higher education institutions in Israel take place frequently and through several different projects and channels. My feeling is that compared to other countries, the position of experts within the government is rather weak and the connection between academia and the ministries is weak. Academia is very independent, very research-oriented—not policy oriented. (INT 25, 2016) And this is why I believe that this job should be done in rotation and that people who come will serve a few years in this position and go back to academia […]. Because, otherwise we lose contacts in the community, we lose contact to what's going on; what's on the agenda. So it's very important in my view that it is a position which is fulfilled by a high-rank academic, recognised by his colleagues. (INT 23, 2016) Moreover, relationships with other scientists that were formed during CSs' scientific careers form a large network of experts that can be contacted and consulted later. This especially helped with regards to setting the agenda on adaptation, as the CS of the MoEP tried to bring together relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, the CS of the MoEP and scientists who were part of the ICCIC argued about the need for evidence-based decision-making in relation to adaptation. Despite the scientific credibility of a CS and the close working relationships with other scientists, one university professor claimed that when it comes to policy formulation, the one great limitation of a CS is the lack of decision-making authority. In the case of adaptation, one NGO worker mentioned that the CS of the MoEP can draft a resolution but does not have the opportunity to enact it into policy (INT 8, 2016). This exemplifies the clear boundaries between collecting expertise for politicians and actual decision-making authority. The CS certainly has independence in prioritizing research on adaptation and advancing adaptation policy, but as a bureaucrat, the CS does not have the power to design and implement governmental policy. [Bureaucrats/politicians say to themselves] climate change will not happen. If it happens it will not be during my term of office. We have other issues to be troubled with or to be concerned about. They know that the likelihood that things will happen is unknown. (INT 12, 2016) Maybe, at the political level there is such an understanding that we will be able to improvise. But we are not rehabilitating at a rate that is appropriate. There is a gap between what the professionals know and what the political level is dealing with. […] There is no systematic planning mentality. You see a lot of ad-hoc decisions. (INT 6, 2017) That CS attributed the lack of long-term planning to the frequent changes of ministers and director gener