Dynamic decision and its complex dynamics analysis of low-carbon supply chain considering risk-aversion under carbon tax policy

Abstract

This study establishes a low-carbon supply chain game model under the centralized decision situation and the decentralized decision situation considering the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior, and discusses the influence of the manufacturer risk-aversion behavior on the optimal decision, profit, coordination, and complex dynamics of the supply chain. We find that comparing with the risk-neutral decentralized decision, the increase of manufacturer’s risk tolerance attitude can narrow the gap between the supply chain profit and the centralized decision, but it will further reduce the carbon emission reduction level. The increase of risk tolerance of the manufacturer and carbon tax will narrow the stable region of the system. Under this situation, the manufacturer should carefully adjust parameters to prevent the system from losing stability, especially the adjustment parameters for carbon emission reduction level. When the system is in a chaotic state, the increase of carbon tax rate makes the system show more complex dynamic characteristics. Under the chaotic state, it is difficult for the manufacturer to make correct price decision and carbon emission reduction strategy for the next period, which damages its profit, but increases the profit of the retailer and the supply chain. Finally, the carbon emission reduction cost-sharing contract is proposed to improve the carbon emission reduction level and the supply chain efficiency, achieving Pareto improvement. The stability region of the system is larger than that in the centralized decision situation, but the increase of the cost sharing coefficient will reduce the stability of the system in the decentralized decision-making situation.