Duty of stewardship and fisheries governance: a proposed framework

Adam Soliman

doi:10.1186/s40152-014-0011-8

Abstract

Fisheries often fall prey to overfishing and the exhaustion of stock. Fishing governance is an ongoing attempt to prevent such an outcome. Over time, fisheries regulation has generally moved from controls on inputs to controls on output, such as catch limits and Individual Transferable Quotas. Individual Transferable Quotas have reduced overcapitalization, and have in some cases allowed stocks to rebuild. However, because they enable market trading of catch shares which tends to concentrate fisheries in fewer hands. This paper proposes applying a duty of stewardship to the existing fisheries governance structure. “Stewardship” is an obligation to be responsible for taking care of another person’s property. The concept of stewardship easily applies to fisheries, because fisheries are natural resources which belong to the public. Current regimes, such as Individual Transferable Quotas (“ITQs”) do not do enough to prevent the employment of destructive fishing practices and place the burden of natural resource management on the government. Assigning a duty of stewardship upon fishers, whether they own or lease an ITQ, would require fishers to be stewards of common resources and use responsible fishing practices.

Highlights

The tragedy of the commons is a well-known phenomenon that describes what can happen if there are no controls on the use of a shared resource and too many users willing to deplete that resource (Hardin 1968)
Under Iowa law, agriculturists are required to care for the land so that it remains productive for someone else’s use in the future (Iowa Code 1997). This legal requirement can be equated to the type of duty of stewardship advocated to be applied to fisheries – it is an obligation to preserve a natural resource, may it be land or a fishery, in good enough condition that a future user can enjoy the same quality of resource
Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) have become a popular solution, partly because it is believed that they provide an incentive to conserve

Summary

Introduction

The tragedy of the commons is a well-known phenomenon that describes what can happen if there are no controls on the use of a shared resource and too many users willing to deplete that resource (Hardin 1968). The concept of a duty of stewardship – a responsibility to take care of the property of others – is compatible with the legal nature of a fishery.

Results

Conclusion