Duty of Stewardship and Fisheries Governance: A Proposed Framework

Abstract

Open access or “capture” fisheries easily fall prey to overfishing and the exhaustion of stock. Fishing governance is an ongoing attempt to prevent such an outcome. Over time, fisheries regulation has generally moved from controls on inputs or effort to controls on output, such as catch limits and Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). ITQs have reduced over-capitalization, and have in some cases allowed stocks to rebuild. However, because they enable market trading of catch shares, they have tended to concentrate fisheries in fewer hands, with negative social consequences.This paper proposes an alternative: defining a duty of stewardship, and applying that duty to fishers and other users. “Stewardship” is an obligation to be responsible for taking care of another person’s property. This concept applies well to fisheries, because the public are the true owners of the fish in most countries. Assigning a duty of stewardship to fishers has several potential advantages: It may promote responsible behavior more effectively than ITQ rights, and the social problems that may result from trading can be avoided. The concept of stewardship is well justified by several principles that are often recommended for fisheries governance: environmental ethics, sustainability, food security, precautionary regulation, and inclusiveness. A duty of stewardship has some elements in common with the public trust doctrine, fiduciary duties, and the obligations of a usufructuary under civil law. There are several routes through which a duty of stewardship could be introduced in fisheries, including attitude changes and market pressures, legislative action, regulatory incentives, education of fishers, and specific provisions in ITQ lease agreements.