Domain-oriented masked bit-parallel finite-field multiplier against side-channel attacks

Abstract

Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) constitutes a serious threat to the security of implemented cryptosystems. In SCA, the attacker can obtain information leakage from a device executing cryptographic algorithms by means of the measure of side-channels such as power consumption, electromagnetic radiation and execution time. For this reason, effective countermeasures against SCA are indispensable in implemented cryptographic devices. The use of masking schemes (in which intermediate computations are independent from the sensible input data) constitutes the most effective approach to achieve resistance against physical attacks. Among the different masking methods proposed for hardware, domain-oriented masking is one of the most promising due to its lower implementation costs, level of security and glitch resistance. In this paper, a new bit-parallel first-order domain-oriented masked finite field multiplier is presented which incorporates the addition of fresh random values without increasing the computation delay. Explicit expressions for the computation of the new masked multiplier for the binary extension field used in the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are also given.