The Effect of Eight-Shuffling AES Implementations Techniques against Side Channel Analysis

Abstract

Even though cryptographic algorithms embedded on physical devices guarantee theoretical security, they are vulnerable to side channel attacks that analyze correlations related to physical information such as power consumption and electromagnetic waves. Physical devices without any countermeasures are vulnerable to side channel analysis. The masking and shuffling techniques the most used countermeasures against side channel analysis. Masking techniques rely on the masking order, however, these techniques have a high computational cost. Shuffling techniques, on the other hand, are able to provide security without high computational cost. Recently, instead of using one countermeasure alone, a combination of them has been employed while still affording provable security at a relatively computational cost. Computational security is related to the complexity of shuffling when a shuffling technique has been employed. In this paper, we apply shuffling techniques of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in a new way. Our technique involves to eight different implementations of AES. If our technique is proven safety, then we will combine masking techniques and our technique. So, we examine the theoretical versus experimentally analyzed number of power traces for the recovery key. Theoretically, our results show 64 times more shuffling complexity than a non-shuffling AES implementation. Experimentally, however, it has seven times greater shuffling complexity.