Distributed event-triggered secondary frequency control of islanded AC microgrids under cyber attacks with input time delay

Abstract

This article proposes a distributed event-triggered secondary frequency control considering cyber attacks and disturbances subject to input delay for islanded AC microgrids (MGs). The reliance on communication networks exposes MGs to cyber attacks. Therefore, detection and prevention of cyber attacks is one of the most important issues for islanded MGs. The purpose of this article is the analysis of the impacts of cyber attacks, such as false data injection (FDI) and denial-of-service (DoS) on communication links and local controllers (LCs), in the presence of time delay in communication links. Our method conserves communication resources by reducing the number of transmissions of sampled data. Also, each distributed generation (DG) can quickly detect and isolate corrupted links and controllers. Moreover, we have analyzed the stability of our proposed strategy by the Lyapunov theory. The superior features of our proposed method, including cyber security, number of transmissions of sampled data, and communication time delay, have been investigated in MATLAB/SimPowersystems Toolbox.