Abstract
In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff. To account for this, we divide the population into two categories. One consists of payoff-driven players, while the other consists of dissimilarity-driven players. The later imitate the minority strategy in their group based on four different dissimilarity-driven behaviors. The rule that most effectively promotes cooperation, and this regardless of the multiplication factor of the public goods game, is when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. If the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy regardless of the payoffs of others, or if their payoff is the same, the population typically evolves towards a neutral state where cooperators and defectors are equally common. This may be beneficial when the multiplication factor is low, when defectors would otherwise dominate. However, if the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is worse than that of their neighbors, then cooperation is not promoted at all in comparison to the baseline case in the absence of dissimilarity-driven behavior. We explore the pattern formation behind these results, and we discuss their wider implications for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups.
Highlights
In the last two decades, evolutionary game theory has strongly developed into a popular research area with a list of applications spanning from biology to social and economic systems[1,2,3,4,5]
A famous case is the social dilemma[18], where the interests of individuals are at odds with what is best for the community as a whole
The evolution of cooperation varies differently when players are guided by type-B behavior, as presented in (Fig. 1(a(2)–d(2)))
Summary
In the last two decades, evolutionary game theory has strongly developed into a popular research area with a list of applications spanning from biology to social and economic systems[1,2,3,4,5]. Using the above-described research as motivation, we here study how dissimilarity-driven players, i.e., players that strive to be different from others in the group regardless of their expected payoffs, impact the evolution of cooperation. We will show that dissimilarity-driven behavior can promote cooperation, especially so when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. Other types of considered dissimilarity-driven behavior will tend to be less efficient in promoting cooperation, and tend to neutralize the population This is sometimes beneficial if compared to the baseline case with no dissimilarity-driven players, in particular if the multiplication factor of the public goods game is low, and sometimes not. We will conclude with a discussion of the importance of these results for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups, and we will briefly outline possible applications where large-scale cooperation is important
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
