Abstract
David Lewis' thesis of Humean Supervenience combines the claims 1) that there are no necessary connections between distinct existences and 2) that truth supervenes on being. Contra Lewis, we should adopt a dispositional rather than a categorical theory of property individuation. Moreover, contra the conventional wisdom, such a theory is consistent with claim 1). However, it cannot be made consistent with claim 2) without abandoning the standard semantics for counterfactuals.
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