Abstract
ABSTRACTThis study investigates how people who believe in conspiracy theory (CT) hold those beliefs. It considers whether believing a conspiracist explanation of an issue or event permits or precludes also believing a non‐conspiracist explanation—that is, the degree to which endorsing CTs can be dialogical. Dialogicality involves the coexistence of conspiracist and non‐conspiracist beliefs in advancing claims and contrasts with the view that all conspiracist belief endorsement is monological or ‘closed’ from other explanations. Thematic analysis of 39 semi‐structured interviews revealed five modalities of belief coexistence: cognitive dissonance between beliefs, analogical beliefs, target‐dependent beliefs, synthetic beliefs, and integrative beliefs. This spanned beliefs about the self, ingroup, outgroup, reality, action and the future, on topics concerning science, religion, and politics and society. These findings challenge the view that all CTs are monological belief systems: CT believers recruit both conspiracist and non‐conspiracist explanations in building their worldview. Several hypotheses for further research emerge from this challenge to the basic assumption of much research on CTs.
Published Version
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