Deterring Violent Non-state Actors

Eitan Shamir

doi:10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_14

Abstract

AbstractThe chapter examines the relevance and applicability of deterrence to violent non-state actors (VNSAs). VNSAs have become important players in the international system. Traditional deterrence theory and practice has limited utility against VNSAs due to their different characteristics to those of states that makes them less susceptive to deterrence strategies. Deterrence theory and practice has had to evolve and adapt to address these special traits of VNSAs. The chapter presents this conceptual evolution and the means and methods developed to deter VNSAs, highlighting both their advantages and shortfalls. It explains why states choose deterrence, even if not perfect, over other strategies. The Israeli case study then demonstrates how a state employs deterrence in relation to several VNSAs with diverse characteristics, levels of threat, political objectives, and military capability. The case study shows how Israel is designing a portfolio of deterrent strategies tailored to each challenge, demonstrating a degree of deterrence flexibility that the state can apply. The chapter concludes that, while the option of deterring VNSAs is not ideal, it does offer a viable strategy for decision makers compared with a number of lesser alternatives.

Highlights

This chapter addresses the relevance and applicability of deterrence to violent non-state actors (VNSAs) and explores three questions in that regard: To what extent is deterrence effective on VNSAs? Which types of deterrence are more effective? What can we learn from historical experience in relation to VNSA deterrence? The answers to these questions are not merely theoretical but may help policy makers decide whether and how to deter VNSAs
After a brief discussion of the general issue, the chapter explains the rise of VNSAs and explores various concepts of deterrence with regard to them, how these have evolved, and how they translate into practice
The concept of the VNSA allows for a broader perspective that encompasses organizations of various type and level of sophistication ranging from ad hoc bands of pirates in Somalia under a local warlord to Hizballah in Lebanon, which runs a state within a state and has military capabilities beyond those of many nations

Summary

Chapter 14

E. Shamir tailored to each challenge, demonstrating a degree of deterrence flexibility that the state can apply. The chapter concludes that, while the option of deterring VNSAs is not ideal, it does offer a viable strategy for decision makers compared with a number of lesser alternatives. Á Á Keywords Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) Cumulative Deterrence ÁÁÁÁÁÁÁ Tailored Deterrence Israel Hamas Hizballah ISIS Al-Qaeda Terrorism

14.1 Introduction

14.2 VNSAs in the International System

14.3 Why Deterring VNSAs is Challenging

14.4 Deterrence Theory and the Impact of VNSAs

14.5 Why States Choose to Deter VNSAs

14.6 How to Deter VNSAs

14.7 Tailored Deterrence

14.8 Case Study Analysis

14.9 Conclusions