Deterring violent non-state actors: dilemmas and implications

Raghda Elbahy

doi:10.1108/jhass-05-2019-003

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to address the limitations of classical deterrence theory in dealing with violent non-state actors (VNSAs). Design/methodology/approach The study uses qualitative methods. Findings It suggests that two measures must be applied; the first one is to rephrase the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition. The second one is to theorize certain approaches for deterring VNSAs which shall remain a key component in, but not the cornerstone of, national security strategies. Originality/value In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and US war on terrorism, the need arose to “revisit” the “Deterrence Theory” to address several changes such as rogue states, cyber threats and VNSAs, especially after the end of the Cold War, when the theory was originally developed. The recent research on VNSAs relates to the fourth wave of deterrence, which highlights its proper role in a new security environment.

Highlights

Deterrence, as a leading theoretical framework during the Cold War (Levine and Levine, 2006), has been subject to criticism (Arie, 2016)
Deterring violent non-state actors: implications of the theory How can deterrence be revisited to overcome the abovementioned limitations? The study suggests two measures; the first one is to rephrase the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition
Deterring violent non-state actors (VNSAs) requires a broad understanding of deterrence

Summary

Introduction

Deterrence, as a leading theoretical framework during the Cold War (Levine and Levine, 2006), has been subject to criticism (Arie, 2016). Deterrence, and other terms such as assured destruction and massive retaliation, have become politically incorrect and lost respectability. Deterrence has been largely neglected, both in confronting the so-called state-terrorism and in response to threats from non-state terrorists (Ece, 2004). New opponents render deterrence a more complicated issue. These opponents include near-peer competitors, like China; regional states like Iran or North Korea; and non-state actors. It is difficult to assume that each set of actors will have the same reaction to deterrent threats

Objectives

Conclusion