Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors

Abstract

ABSTRACT: The role of landpower is as integral to US defense needs as landpower short of war. But what about the role of landpower between these two in environments in which violent nonstate actors dominate? In such cases, it is best to devolve opposing violent nonstate actors as quickly as possible so policing forces can implement follow-on strategies. Landpower can help provide security conditions under which these strategies can be facilitated. ********** And just like their allies in Al Qaeda, this new Taliban is more network than army, more of a community of interest than a corporate structure. GEN Stanley A. McChrystal (1) Landpower represents the application of force generated by conventional militaries--be they classical Roman legionnaires, medieval European knights, or modern US soldiers. Such power is generated by land forces, essentially the [p]ersonnel, weapon systems, vehicles, and support elements operating on land to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. (2) Boots-on-the-ground integrated into Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) represents our state-of-the art operational approach to ground combat operations. In turn, official publications define landpower and what it influences: [L]and power.... The ability--by threat, force, or occupation--to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. [It is] the primary means to impose the Nation's will on an enemy, by force when necessary; establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development;.... (3) The integral nature of landpower to US defense needs--essentially in interstate war--is well recognized, as is the role of the United Sates Army as the nation's principal land force. (4) The contribution of landpower short of war--for influence, deterrence, and humanitarian purposes--is also well accepted. More problematic is the relationship of landpower to environments in which violent nonstate actors dominate. Far less obvious is the role of landpower in irregular warfare, intrastate war waged by belligerents who are not states--along with its attendant organized criminal, illicit economic, and governmental corruption components. (5) The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that, while operational successes in such campaigns may be won at a high cost in US treasure, they are not economically sustainable. Further, the strategic goals of those campaigns--the desired results which would fulfill the multinational security objectives--could only be partially met. While the Ba'athist and Taliban governments have been removed from power--and more importantly al Qaeda forces decimated--both states are fragile, suffer from tribal and sectarian violence, and are beset with dysfunctional governments. At best, the campaigns waged in Iraq and Afghanistan can be considered only partial victories, at worst, partial failures. (6) With these perceptions in mind, this article will look at the relationship of landpower to violent nonstate actors. In order to do this, these actors first will be characterized along with their landpower-like attributes. Second, an overview of state policing and military forces will be provided. Third, landpower-related application strategies will be discussed. This article will end with some lessons concerning the need for networks when confronting violent nonstate actors and will provide a few cautionary remarks about democratic capacity building in the age of austerity now upon us. Violent Nonstate Actors The threats represented by violent nonstate actors are as old as the earliest states. Bandits, raiders, and pirates have plagued civilized peoples around the globe for millennia. A contemporary view of these actors is that they exist along a threat continuum from that of common criminals to criminal-soldiers (see Figure 1). [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] Criminals are at the left side of the continuum and are characterized as having limited violence and corruption capabilities. …