Abstract

The US-led security architecture in East Asia is designed around open access to the oceans. The bilateral alliance system is disaggregated between the United States and its treaty allies, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand. India and Vietnam are becoming consequential strategic partners in this framework. This structure is part of an elaborate global security system. In East Asia, the US defense commitments are designed to deter and dissuade China, the foremost major threat to the United States, as well as two lesser threats, North Korea and Russia. America’s new approach is called “integrated deterrence,” which plans to use all elements of national power. These alliances are key components of this concept by advancing liberal values in the global commons that enable seamless operations across warfighting domains, theaters, and the spectrum of conflict. The links among the allied states and the multiplier effect of their common interests require free and open access to the world’s oceans. There is a vast distance between China’s expectations for its own EEZ and its use and encroachment of other states’ EEZs. The disparity is driven by China’s perception and the reality that it is geographically disadvantaged, hemmed into mainland Asia with a relatively modest EEZ that is less than one-tenth of the United States or France. The lack of legitimate jurisdiction or control beyond 12 nm has caused China to continue to expand its maritime claims to grab strategic space. Its appetite has expanded commensurate with its growth in power. While China’s actions may be explained by calculations of power, it is also fed by psychological off-balance created by political geography. Sharing borders with 14 other nations, China has India and Russia as powerful nuclear neighbors in the west and north, an unstable North Korea and US allies South Korea and Japan in the east, and strategic partner Vietnam and US allies Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia in the south. China is surrounded. The maritime claims reflect a visceral insecurity and hubris to refashion the political geography in East Asia. At the same time, regional order and alliance security are dependent on a free and open maritime order. The alliance system is required to ensure regional security and deter China from completely dominating the surrounding states. While ground has been lost over the past 20 years as China failed to comply with UNCLOS, its actions have generated a backlash, both in the United States and among regional states. This coalition is strengthening partnerships to deter further erosion in the liberal maritime order. The costs of China’s noncompliance continue to mount and are reflected in the formation of a coalition of alliance partners and strategic relationships. Any successes by China to further expand its influence and erode the maritime order will naturally produce greater cohesion and common interest.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call