DESARTICULANDO LOS COMPONENTES DISCURSIVOS POPULISTA Y POPULAR EN LA POLÍTICA LATINOAMERICANA DEL SIGLO XXI

Korean Abstract: 무역·통상 부문에서부터 정치·외교 분야에 이르기까지 미국과 중국 간 갈등은 여러 지역에서 다양한 형태로 나타나고 있다. 특히 포스트 코로나 시대에 다자주의 체제가 위협을 받고 보호무역주의가 대두될 것으로 전망됨에 따라 양국간 갈등은 더욱 격화될 개연성이 있다. 중남미 지역도 미·중 갈등의 이슈에서 예외가 아니다. 더욱이 중남미 지역과 미국의 지리적 근접성을 고려한다면, 안보 측면에서도 미국은 중남미 지역 내 중국의 영향력이 커지는 것에 민감하게 반응할 수밖에 없다. 이러한 이유로 중남미 지역 내에서 미·중 경쟁 또는 갈등의 양상이 다양한 형태로 나타나고 있다. 본 연구는 중남미 지역에서 나타나는 미·중 경쟁의 양상을 조사하고 이것이 중남미 국가들에 미치는 영향을 다방면에서 분석하였다. 제2장에서는 미국과 중국의 대중남미 정책이 어떻게 변해왔는지 살펴보고 트럼프 정부에서 추진한 구체적인 대중남미 정책을 정리하였다. 미국 대중남미 정책의 기본방향은 소위 당근과 채찍을 통해 중남미 지역 패권국으로서의 위치를 점하는 것이었다. 그에 따라 트럼프 정부 출범 후 다양한 부문에서 중남미를 압박하는 경향이 두드러졌다. 반면 중국의 대중남미 정책은 구체적 내용이 부재한 상태에서 중남미 국가들과의 협력관계를 유지하는 것에 그 목적이 있었다. 제3장에서는 중남미 지역에서 관찰되는 미·중 갈등 사례를 제시하였다. 이러한 갈등은 주로 인프라 부문에서 두드러졌는데, 갈등 상황에서 미국은 중남미 국가들을 압박하고 중국을 관련 프로젝트에서 배제하려는 시도들이 나타났다. 제4장에서는 실증분석을 수행하였는데, 2018년에 일어난 미·중 통상갈등, 즉 양국 사이의 보복관세 조치에 초점을 맞추어 이것이 중남미 주요국의 대미국 및 대중국 수출에 미친 영향을 분석하였다. 또한 연산가능일반균형모형(CGE: Computational General Equilibrium)을 통해 동 통상갈등이 중남미 국가들의 후생에 미치는 영향을 보완적으로 살펴보았다. 분석결과 브라질의 대중 수출액은 관세부과 이후 큰 폭으로 증가한 후 시간이 지나면서 그 효과가 사라지는 추세를 보였다. 반면 브라질 이외 다른 국가들의 경우 일관된 추세가 나타나지 않았다. CGE를 활용하여 분석한 미·중 통상갈등이 중남미 주요국 후생수준에 미치는 영향도 그 크기가 미미한 것으로 나타났다. 중남미 내에서 발생하는 미·중 간 갈등은 우리나라 기업에 중남미 진출의 기회요인이 될 수 있다. 미국의 압박에 직면한 중남미 국가들이 해당 분야, 특히 인프라 부문에서 중국을 배제하려는 움직임을 보이면서 의도하지 않았던 기회가 주어질 가능성이 있다. 그러므로 중남미 국가들의 정치적 입장을 모니터링하는 것은 향후 중남미 진출 기회를 모색하는 측면에서 중요하다.English Abstract: Conflicts between the United States and China have been appearing in various forms across many regions; it can be seen in trade, commerce, politics, and diplomacy. In addition, it is likely that the conflicts between the two countries intensify as the multilateralism would be threatened and protectionism would emerge in the post-COVID 19 era. Latin America is not an exception to this issue of the US-China conflict. In terms of national security, the United States has only option to react sensitively to the growing influence of China in Latin America, considering the geographical proximity between the United States and Latin America. For this reason, varied conflicts between the United States and China occur in Latin America. This study investigated the patterns of US-China rivalry that appeared in Latin America and analyzed the effects of this rivalry on Latin American countries in multifaceted ways. In Chapter 2, we examined how the US and Chinese foreign policies against Latin America have changed. Furthermore, we summarized specific policies against Latin America that were implemented under the Trump administration. The fundamental goal of the US policy was to occupy a regional hegemony in Latin America by giving them incentive and pressure. In particular, the Trump administration tended to weigh on Latin America in many sectors such as immigration, infrastructure, and so on. By contrast, Chinese policies against Latin America aim at maintaining cooperative relations with Latin America in the absence of specifics. In Chapter 3, we presented several examples of the US-China conflict that were observed in Latin America. This conflict was mostly prominent in the infrastructure sector, in which the United States was likely to press Latin America in order to exclude China from related projects. In Chapter 4, we conducted an empirical analysis by focusing on the trade dispute between the United States and China that occurred in 2018. Specifically, we analyzed the impact of the retaliatory tariffs between the two countries on exports of major Latin America countries to United States and China. In addition, we complementarily examined the effect of the trade dispute on the welfare of the Latin American countries with the CGE (Computational General Equilibrium) model. As a result of the empirical analysis, Brazil’s export to China have increased significantly since the imposition of the tariffs, and then the effect has disappeared over time. In contrast, there was no consistent pattern for countries other than Brazil. The impact of the US-China conflict on the welfare of the countries in Latin America was trivial. The conflict between the United States and China that occurs in Latin America could be an opportunity for Korean companies that seek to advance into Latin America. The companies may be given an unintended chance as Latin America is faced by US pressure to rule out China from infrastructure sector. Therefore, it would be important to monitor the political position of Latin American countries in terms of seeking opportunities to enter Latin America in the future.

A History of Latinx Immigrant Activism

Brazil and Italy, Jair Bolsonaro and Matteo Salvini, two populist leaders who, in Latin America and Europe, and alongside Donald Trump in the US, experienced a strong affirmation in 2018 – Italy and Brazil — and 2016 US, respectively. This paper aims to analyse whether and to what extent Bolsonaro and Salvini have effectively created the People through the equivalential chain. That is, according to Laclau, the specificity of populism lies in the ability of a leader to transform a shapeless social group into a unique People. The leader’s speech establishes the borders, and it is through identification with the leader’s speech that the People’s collective identity is formed. Using three dimensions – the leader, the ideology and the audience – we analyse the similarities and differences between the two experiences. The results show how the populist reason of the Brazilian and Italian leaders was highly functional in creating a broad consensus but also how precarious and fragile this consensus was.

Charles W. Bergquist (1942–2020)

Under what conditions can populist leaders achieve success in different democratic systems? What opportunities do other political players have against autocratic intrigues? Are the formal institutions of the United States strong enough to resist President Trump’s violation of norms? These are the main questions of this volume, which collects various approaches to examine the impact of populism on liberal democracy. Since November 2016, one camp of scholars has interpreted Trump’s political rise and doings as a series of attempts to destroy liberal democracy, while another other camp is relatively sanguine thanks to its solid faith in the political institutions of the United States. As an important example of the former, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) book How Democracies Die focuses on the ongoing erosion of democratic norms, like “mutual toleration” between political competitors and “forbearance”, as a minimum level of cooperation. They argue that if unwritten rules are violated, the system of democracy will be undermined. The authors of this volume also express their concerns about political processes, but most of them belong to the latter, more optimistic group. According to Kurt Weyland and Raúl Madrid, President Trump can do serious damage in some policy areas (such as environmental and foreign policy). But he cannot achieve major institutional transformations and undermine American democracy. Despite the great virtue of the moderate and systematic approach of the book, there is a feeling that scientists in the two camps are still speaking past each other. Weyland and Madrid’s analysis propounds a cross-national framework for studying populists in government, which emphasizes the role of the political institutions and the parties but slightly underestimates the softer aspects of politics, such as democratic norms. As experts of democratic processes and populism in various regions, the authors aim to offer comparative lessons from Europe and Latin America, where populism was able to achieve significant political success. Unlike these regions, the United States’ political and social context does not favor populist actors. In the introduction, Weyland and Madrid determine four types of obstacles that prevent further expansion of populism. First, the separation of powers is linked to the federal and presidential system of government. Sovereign institutions and almost equal power relations between the two parties in Congress make it difficult to concentrate power. The next impediment to autocratic maneuvers is the stable and cohesive two-party system, which means for Trump not only a strong opposition but a decentralized Republican party, on which he has no direct influence. The massive polarization of American politics has helped the president seize power, but at the same time, it precludes him from further strengthening. Third, prevailing political and social cleavages, the percentage of ethnic groups and classes of the electorate are not favorable to a populist shift because there is no way for Trump to build a broad coalition. Finally, the absence of a crisis does not allow Trump to appear as a savior of the nation. Based on these barriers, Weyland and Madrid predict a democratic backlash “in which the leaders of both parties agree to enact reforms designed to prevent future violations of democratic norms” (p. 33). However, not all authors share this optimistic view, some of them more explicitly warn the dangers of the American populist phenomenon. Including the introduction and conclusion, the book consists of seven chapters. The individual studies highlight different aspects of the analytical framework presented above (e.g. party systems and strategies, social cleavages). The first three chapters provide comprehensive insights on populist cases from Latin America, East-Central and Western Europe and draw illuminating assumptions concerning Trump’s presidency. In the following, the focus is on the United States and the likely impacts on the public sphere of Trump's politics. We begin the examination of the book with the political context in which populist leaders gain power. The story of a populist ascension usually starts within a state of emergency: countries of Latin America and East-Central Europe were suffering a prolonged crisis when a political leader emerged and took power. As Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser examines, after the takeover, a personalistic “strongman” implemented economic reforms and at the same time promoted broad institutional transformations, and even introduced new constitutions (Chapter 1). As the cases of Fujimori and Chávez show, effective crisis management or increasing welfare expenditures can legitimize the efforts of populist presidents to govern without constraint. Among the countries studied the Netherlands and the United States are notable exceptions. Populists got power in developed democracies in the absence of a social crisis by bringing deeply divisive issues to the forefront such as immigration, Islam, and national identity. It is important to note that their impact on the political systems is more limited than the impact of populist counterparts in weaker democracies. How could populist leaders concentrate so much power in their hands? Kevin Deegan-Krause presents East-Central European ethno-nationalistic versions of populism where the concentration of power in parliamentary systems allowed for populist leaders to hijack democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Filling public institutions with functionaries, making uneven political conditions by legislation, state capture, eliminating independent media, intimidation of critics and opponents—are only a few devices from the toolbox to dismantle democratic pluralism. Weak institutions of Latin American and East-Central European democracies were unable to resist these radical transformations. The political structure of the United States is different because the system of checks and balances disperses power among political actors. This arrangement of horizontal accountability normally precludes that the President circumvents either the legislature or the jurisdiction. Trump has serious power of appointment, and he can violate democratic norms. But his position is weaker than the position of populist leaders in European parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, as Deegan-Krause and Bonikowski argue in their chapters, Trump’s transgressive style and the unpredictable consequences of his actions can erode formal institutions. Institutional weakness cannot be understood without the assessment of political power relations. As Orbán’s supermajority illustrates, a hegemonic populist actor can shape institutions in his image, thereby making them dysfunctional. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove show a different constellation, where the governing party is not in the dominant position (Chapter 3). The “parliamentary system of government forces the chief executive to forge a majority support coalition, which is not easy to do in Italy’s multi-party system” (p. 97) or in the Netherlands. Most European and Latin American populist leaders have risen in a fragmented party system with low legitimacy. Many can rely on a loyal, highly personalized party (e.g. Berlusconi, Mečiar, Orbán) which works as an effective machinery for obtaining political resources. In contrast, Trump came to power in a well-established two-party system with limited influence on the Republican Party. Moreover, there is an apparent cleavage inside the GOP between the old party elite, who lost its gatekeeping role, and the movement-based membership (Tea Party), who puts controversial cultural issues at the forefront. According to Kenneth Roberts, the high level of ideological and party polarization not only demoralizes, but it tends to politicize public institutions, and ultimately, it will erode the legitimacy of the system (Chapter 5). Escalating polarization and “movementization” led to radical changes in the electoral arena, because “they sorted voters into rival and increasingly hostile partisan camps, strengthening partisan identities” (p. 137). The social and ethnic structure of the United States prevents the formation of a broad social coalition for Trump. As Bart Bonikowski presents, the American president’s rhetorical style combines an exclusionary view of nationalism with anti-elite and authoritarian components which undoubtedly distorts political discourse and increases polarization (Chapter 4). This type of populism can be attractive for less-educated voters who make up a smaller part of the electorate, while in turn, the educated electorate and ethnic minorities stigmatized by Trump may also be mobilized to support Democrats. In this sharply divided political field, moralistic political views and antagonistic partisan identities reinforce social and political cleavages. According to Verbeek and Zaslove, one of the most important positive effects of populism on liberal democracy is to integrate those voices of those felt excluded. New issues and movements could reach out to disenchanted political orphans to rise above an outsider-leader who looks like “one of us”, but on the negative side, moralistic and militant rhetoric deepen further existing divisions and produce new ones. Polarization is one of the main motifs of the book that turns up chapter by chapter. As Madrid and Weyland state in the conclusion, “the high levels of political polarization in the United States pose a significant obstacle to efforts by Trump to obtain the electoral dominance that other populists have used to consolidate power and transform their countries’ political institutions” (p. 169). This antagonism in the US suitably explains why we should not be afraid of a rapid autocratic turn, but it is not reassuring when we think of the destruction of democratic norms. Formal institutions can function as fortresses (for a while), but as Roberts finds, the extent of democratic deterioration largely depends on the strategy of Republicans. Most likely the party leadership will stand by Trump, not only supporting him in legislation and appointments but also defending his anti-democratic behavior. So, is the glass of water half-full or half-empty? The answer depends on whether the emphasis is on the institutions or the action. The great value of this volume is that it presents different views and aspects of populism that the readers can compare with each other. It is highly recommended to scholars interested in the theories of populism and democracy.

Anti-Pathos

<i>Cultural Capital</i>: Reflections from a Latin Americanist

A Regional Perspective on the U.S. and Chinese Visions for East Asia Yuen Foong Khong (bio) The visions that great powers have for their neighborhood or regions farther afield are almost always about themselves—i.e., their role, power, and prestige in that neighborhood or region. The Monroe Doctrine was about fending off European encroachment into Latin America so that the United States could establish itself as the hegemon of the region. Xi Jinping's "China dream" is about internal rejuvenation, the consequence of which is a China that can stand tall in Asia. This essay examines how the United States and China view their respective roles and power in East Asia, how those views have changed over time, and what the implications are for the regional order. The Trump administration's perspective, I argue, is similar to that of previous administrations in assuming that U.S. hegemony is essential to maintaining security order in the region. China's perspective, on the other hand, has changed with time: while it welcomed the U.S. role in maintaining the security order in the past, China now believes that its growing clout makes it the United States' coequal in the region. Yet it is unlikely that the Trump administration will grant China that coequality. This sets the stage for heightened Sino-U.S. rivalry in the years to come, with China challenging the United States on multiple fronts, and the rest of East Asia having to choose sides. The United States' Perspective and Policies The United States sees itself as an Asia-Pacific power that plays a crucial role in the maintenance of the region's security order.1 The U.S. position is premised on its preponderant military power, its network of military alliances and strategic partners, and the institutions and instruments of the global market economy. Successive administrations have deemed it a vital U.S. interest to prevent the rise of a hostile hegemon in three key regions of the world: Western Europe, the Persian Gulf, and East Asia. That is another [End Page 6] way of saying that the United States expects to remain the hegemon of these regions—from this perspective, U.S. hegemony is both good for the United States and good for world order. For much of the Cold War and most of the 1990s, this view of the United States as the primary provider of security and economic order in East Asia was not seriously challenged. In retrospect, the United States' hot wars in Korea and Vietnam may be seen as responses to Communist challenges to its hegemonic position in the region. East Asian leaders welcomed the U.S. projection of military power in their region, as can be seen from the presence of U.S. troops and materiel in bases in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the 1990s, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia also encouraged the U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asia by allowing the United States to use their facilities. East Asian policymakers spoke of the need for a strong U.S. military presence to maintain peace and stability, when what they actually meant was that they were content with U.S. hegemony. After September 11, some East Asian policymakers felt that the United States was distracted by its global war on terrorism and failed to pay sufficient attention to power shifts in the region. It is true that the United States skipped some multilateral meetings during the George W. Bush years, but it did what really mattered: consolidating its alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia, while bringing in India as a trusted strategic partner. Similarly, many in East Asia welcomed the Obama administration's pivot or rebalancing to Asia, which they portrayed as the United States "returning" to balance a rising China. But the United States never left the region, and the pivot was an attempt to reinforce U.S. hegemony, not balance China. The Trump administration's "America first" National Security Strategy continues this emphasis on U.S. military preponderance and leadership. The document is replete with phrases about the importance of the United States retaining military "overmatch" vis-à-vis its adversaries and maintaining a "favorable...

Author’s Response

Political scientists have long asserted that populists use simpler language than their mainstream rivals to appeal to ordinary people and distance themselves from elites. However, there is little comparative evidence in support of that claim. In this study, we investigate the linguistic simplicity of four right-wing populists compared to their principal opponents in the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Italy. We do so by analysing a corpus of approximately one million words from leaders’ speeches, using a series of linguistics measures for evaluating simplicity. Contrary to expectations, we find that Donald Trump was only slightly simpler than Hillary Clinton, while Nigel Farage in the UK and Marine Le Pen in France were more complex than their main rivals, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini was simpler on some measures but not others. We conclude that the simple language claim is not borne out and that other aspects of the received wisdom about populism should be re-examined.

The paper is focused on the contradiction between legal and political rationales in the field of migration regulation on national and international levels. The fundamental norms laid down in the corpus of law may conflict with the politicians&rsquo; views on the viability of various courses of action. This opens the door to serious collisions between agents motivated by divergent rationales. In practice, however, the subject matter is not so much the difference in rationales but rather differences in interpretation of legal arguments by various actors. They resort to these arguments to the extent that one or another of legal provisions helps legitimizing their political position and actions. Discrepancy in attitudes towards migratory issues creates a number of conflicts which can be classified as follows. (a) The collision of priorities (namely, protection of human rights versus concerns on national security); (b) the collision between proclaimed values and pragmatic rationales; (c) the collision between public rhetoric of the right populists and the game rules set up by liberal-conservative consensus of the political mainstream. The first collision is illustrated by the controversy between American judiciary and D. Trump administration around the travel ban imposed on citizens of Muslim countries as well as the conflict between Executives and the Legislative power on Trump&rsquo;s project to build a wall on Mexican border. The second collision is being played out in the European Union after the refugee crisis (2015): mainstream politicians have to balance between their agenda and pressure from the far-right, so they tend to combine liberal rhetoric with restrictive policies. The example for the third collision is the behaviour of the Italian governing coalition 2018&ndash;2019, when Matteo Salvini and his adherents turned out to be less resolute in implementing anti-immigration measures than they promised during election campaign.

ABSTRACT: China's expansion into Latin America might well outflank US rebalance in Asia. The United States needs a broader strategic option, one capable of ensuring access to markets and of reducing future strategic risk to US interests in Latin America. ********** The rise of Chinese power in Asia-Pacific region and in Latin America is a growing concern for US strategy. Recent US focus on Middle East has facilitated Beijing's political, economic, and military expansion from Pacific into South America. A new global economy has opened opportunities for growth and development with China and others in Asia-Pacific. Some countries have responded with commitment to China in terms of economic trade and investment. In addition, governments such as Peru, Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica have pledged international political support for Chinese interests, arms sales, and military training and education cooperation. These developments challenge US strategy, as Chinese presence in both regions is arguably part of an intensifying competition between Beijing and United States. This developing trans-Pacific interdependency between two regions creates one integrated problem rather than two separate regional ones. The growing cooperation between governments in both regions and China presents political, economic, and military challenges that call for incorporation of Western Hemisphere into a Asia-Pacific strategy. Evan Ellis notes, the principal strategic imperative for United States historically has been, and continues to be, region's geographic and economic connectedness to this country. (1) First, different political interests of United States and China can create tension and instability, or deny US access in both regions. Second, extensive trade and investment agreements across both regions are creating economic interdependencies and undermining US influence, and generating further political, social, and economic tensions. Third, People's Republic of China's (PRC) military posture and forward presence in South China Sea aims to improve its anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) capacity. The PRC's military expansion through arms sales and other means provide security alternatives for Latin American governments and support Chinese military power in Asia-Pacific region. For these reasons, rebalancing to Asia does not adequately address growing interdependencies between two regions and Beijing's pursuit of its interests. Accordingly, United States must adapt its regional approach to Asia. Cross-regional cooperation in policy areas outside trade and investment is emerging independently, such as military training and arms sales, which demands a more holistic and synchronized approach. Without a broader Pacific strategy, non-economic cooperation can hinder United States and security and prosperity of its allies and partners. The United States should expand rebalance to Asia into a trans-Pacific strategy that incorporates Latin America. Without a transpacific strategy, a US regional approach will only create strategic risk, and enable China to draw on its influence in Western Hemisphere to support its interests elsewhere. This article examines political, economic, and military challenges posed by China's increasing influence in both regions, and discusses why a new trans-Pacific strategy can best address them. Political Challenges Beijing's political actions in Latin America and Asia-Pacific region are creating an integrated cross-regional problem for US interests rather than two separate regional ones. In response to Chinese actions in latter, United States has strengthened its regional relations and defense cooperation with Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Meanwhile, China's actions have resulted in more political influence (in Western Hemisphere) with traditional and non-traditional US partners, potentially undermining US values and relationships. …

Nelson A. Rockefeller’s Office of Inter-American Affairs (1940-1946) and Record Group 229

This article is devoted to the analysis of trade and economic relations between the United States and China with Latin American countries. This region is a sphere of competitive confrontation between the two countries not only for foreign policy ties, but also for trade and economic ones. The authors in this article show the peculiarities of the bilateral relations between China and the United States with Latin America and describe the process of changing US policy towards Latin America after 2017, when it radically changed after the Trump administration came to power, and Beijing, taking advantage of this opportunity, began to compete with Washington in this region. Also, in this article, the authors provide a comparative analysis of the indicators of trade and economic relations between China and the United States with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. The scientific novelty of this work lies in the fact that, using the example of the transition of leading positions towards China, the authors, within the framework of the theory of "power transit" (Power transition theory), describe the competitive struggle of states in this region in trade and economic terms, which is inextricably linked with political relations. The main conclusions are that the United States is still an external force that cannot be ignored in Latin American international relations, while China has every chance of gradually displacing the United States from the foreign market in Latin America thanks to its economic projects with the introduction of leading Latin American countries in the economic sphere. The United States of America, in turn, is trying to maintain its position in this region by easing its economic and financial constraints and, thereby, inclining the political leadership of Latin American countries to its side.

Evidence suggests that Latin Americans display elevated levels of emotional expressivity and positivity. Here, we tested whether Latin Americans possess a unique form of interdependence called expressive interdependence, characterized by the open expression of positive emotions related to social engagement (e.g., feelings of closeness to others). In Study 1, we compared Latin Americans from Chile and Mexico with European Americans in the United States, a group known to be highly independent. Latin Americans expressed positive socially engaging emotions, particularly in response to negative events affecting others, whereas European Americans favored positive socially disengaging emotions, such as pride, especially in response to personally favorable circumstances. Study 2 replicated these findings with another group of Latin Americans from Colombia and European Americans in the United States. Study 2 also included Japanese in Japan, who expressed positive emotions less than Latin and European Americans. However, Japanese displayed a higher tendency to express negative socially engaging emotions, such as guilt and shame, compared to both groups. Our data demonstrate that emotional expression patterns align with overarching ethos of interdependence in Latin America and Japan and independence among European Americans. However, Latin Americans and Japanese exhibited different styles of interdependence. Latin Americans were expressive of positive socially engaging emotions, whereas Japanese were less expressive overall. Moreover, when Japanese expressed emotions, they emphasized negative socially engaging emotions. Implications for theories of culture and emotion are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).