Democratic Transition, Persistent Civilian Control over the Military, and the South Korean Anomaly

Abstract

South Korea's civilian control over the military has been amazingly stable, and no signs of political moves by the military have ever been detected since 1993. Given the frequency of military's intervention in civil politics and a relatively long duration of military rule, such civil-military relations seem quite anomalous. The article argues that the persistent civilian control over the military was an outcome of path-dependency of the military rule that disfavours military intervention in civil politics, while strengthening civilian control over the military. In South Korea, the military did not intervene in civilian politics as an institution. Two military interventions (1961 and 1979) were nothing but greedy acts of politically motivated military officers, and those who seized political power crafted institutional arrangements that could prevent another military intervention. Consequently, the military in South Korea was highly de-politicized, and path dependency has produced a structure rather favourable to civilian control over the military in the post-democratic transition period. Sanctioning and monitoring deserve special attention in this regard. Finally, socio-economic development and overall democratic maturity have led to the popular rejection of the military as a political actor, fostering the norm of traditional professionalism within the military.