Abstract
The main mechanism bringing public policy into line with popular preferences, as democracy requires, has traditionally been seen as purposive voting by electors, which political parties either adapt to or provide clear choices for a mandate. This paper puts forward an alternative account, in which ideologically rooted parties are the key players, alternating their preferred policy targets in government and thereby bringing implemented policy into line with centrist majority preferences. Alternation fits the evidence better, works for specific issues as well as general Left-Right differences, and links up with other validated theories of party and government behaviour. This discussion is from Ian Budge, Politics: A Unified Introduction to How Democracy Works, pp 106-113. See also ‘Studying Supply and Demand for Public Goods’ posted on SSRN.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call