Abstract
Cumplido, María and al. have recently shown that the Wang-Hu digital signature is not secure and has presented a potential attack on the root extraction problem. The effectiveness of generic attacks on solving this problem for braids is still uncertain and it is unknown if it is possible to create braids that require exponential time to solve these problems. In 2023, Lin and \textit{al.} has proposed a post-quantum signature scheme similar to the Wang-Hu scheme that is proven to be able to withstand attacks from quantum computers. This paper presents evidence of an algorithm that uses mean-set attacks to obtain the private key in two different schemes, without having to solve the root extraction problem. Additionally, in the post-quantum signature version, we demonstrate that an attacker can forge a signature that will pass verification without actually recovering the private key.
Published Version
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