Critical realism as a fractal philosophy

Abstract

ABSTRACT There are two overarching questions that guide this paper: What are some potential issues with the criterion for judgemental rationality as developed by Bhaskar? How can critical realism itself be justified without foundationalist assumptions or an infinite regress of justification? The paper considers how Bhaskar’s criterion for theory choice – developed in the natural sciences – can also be applied in the social sciences, how a criterion developed within epistemic relativity can be applied to overcome judgemental relativity, and explores justification of critical realism and of research inspired by this philosophy of science. It will be argued that a fractal form of justification can be an important approach to justify critical realist philosophy and its meta-philosophy (or ‘the philosophy of philosophy’). I also seek to demonstrate that such fractal justification, and insights from other fractally coherent philosophies, can be helpful to provide answers to several of the issues with Bhaskar’s criterion for judgemental rationality that are presented.