Falsificationism redux: in search of explanatory rationality in historical sociology

Abstract

ABSTRACT Those who study unique events and processes cannot manipulate the world to ‘test’ theories, to ensure conclusions are rational, as falsificationism prescribes. This has left historical sociologists and kindred researchers to use hermeneutics, forms of counterfactual reasoning, and covering laws, but these techniques do not ensure explanations are accountable to the object of inquiry. I repurpose the falsificationist principle of negativity to serve rational theoretical redescriptions of this class of objects. We must work in a theoretical medium, as the main criticism of falsificationism maintains. Theoretical prejudices can nevertheless be held in check, making space for new conclusions, via the double break characteristic of scientific reflexivity. A directional dynamic toward rational explanations can then result by starting with negative cases, which inherently bring case-theory misfits into focus, and applying immanent critique to cycle from worse to better such fits. This allows us to manipulate our theories to ‘test’ the world.