Conventional Deterrence and the Challenge of Credibility

Abstract

The concept of ‘credibility’ is a central component of deterrence theory. In this article, credibility is used as a lens through which to examine the effectiveness of conventional force as a deterrent. An advantage that conventional force enjoys over its nuclear counterpart is that it can be used with much greater discrimination. Conventional threats can, therefore, be considered more politically credible than nuclear threats under all but the most extreme circumstances. Conversely, the relatively modest power of conventional weapons renders their effects ‘interpretable’ to a problematic degree by potential aggressors. Thus, such threats are less likely to be as technically credible as their nuclear equivalents. A range of communicative efforts may serve to reduce the scope for interpreting the effects possible to conventional weapons, although efforts of this kind risk being hampered by cultural obstacles. In consequence, success with conventional deterrence will turn on the ability to identify the specific technical and cultural conditions under which credible threats can readily be made.