Theory and Nuclear Proliferation in the Twenty-First Century: The Limits of Realism

Abstract

In this chapter, we consider whether the realist approach to international politics is as robust for explanation and prediction of nuclear deterrence as it has been for conventional warfare. Realists have made a strong case for their preferred approach as an alternative to idealism or to constructivism. Realism offers an especially coherent paradigm and one that is especially sensitive to the relationship between force and policy. However, the realism that might apply to conventional warfare or deterrence could be mistaken or misleading as a guide to the pursuit of nuclear deterrence or arms limitation. Nuclear weapons are unique in their ability to create mass destruction in a short time period, with irreversible damage to societies, cultures and climate. Therefore, whereas conventional deterrence depends primarily on the credible threat by the defender to respond by inflicting military defeat on the aggressor, nuclear deterrence emphasizes the credible threat of retaliatory punishment, with unacceptable damage against society and armed forces of the attacker. The “realism” of nuclear deterrence would seem to rest, not only on a scientifically rational calculation of costs and benefits, but also upon a moral compass that would not risk the unacceptable destruction imposed by even small nuclear wars.