Contract Law’s Red Herring: Exposing “Intention” as a Guise for Consideration

Abstract

This paper describes and evaluates the contested fourth requirement for contract formation: the intention of both parties that their agreement be legally enforceable (“legal intention”). I begin with an overview of the jurisprudence on legal intention, ending with the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent pronouncement in Ethiopian Orthodox Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga. While the Court in this case affirmed that legal intention is to be treated as a fourth requirement, its analysis reveals precisely the reason why it should not be: when courts purport to analyze legal intention, an inherently difficult value to assess, they often lapse into a veiled assessment of consideration instead. I draw on Peter Benson's conception of "robust consideration" to argue that we should dispense with the legal intention requirement. In its place, a clear test for robust consideration would allow courts to conduct self-aware analyses free from contorted intention assessments. I conclude by offering an interpretation of Balfour v Balfour, the seminar case supporting a legal intention requirement, that is consistent with my proposed approach to contract formation.