Construction and Application of the Double Game Model for Direct Purchase of Electricity by Large Consumers under Consideration of Risk Factors

Abstract

With the development of global clean energy and the implementation of carbon emission reduction policies, the direct purchase of electricity by large consumers has been increasingly promoted as a special form of electricity trading. Therefore, on the basis of the completion of low-carbon emission reduction targets in each country, how to rationalize the electricity purchase by large consumers in the electricity market so as to reduce their electricity purchase costs has become the main target of attention in each country. Currently, there are fewer studies in existing research on the direct electricity purchase strategy of large consumers under the consideration of the weight of consumption responsibility and risk. Based on this, this paper constructs a dual-game model for direct electricity purchase by large consumers based on the Stackelberg game and non-cooperative game theory. The concept of value at risk is further introduced, and the optimal strategy of direct electricity purchase by large consumers is proposed. The results of this study show that when market players make decisions on the purchase and sale of electricity, power suppliers will increase their biddings to obtain the highest returns, and large consumers can reduce the transaction costs by combining the medium- and long-term market with the spot market to purchase electricity. In the choice of electricity purchase market, with the increasing risk factor, large consumers shift from the risky spot market to the less risky medium- and long-term market and option market. This paper provides a reference for the issues of power suppliers’ contract bidding and large consumers’ electricity purchase strategy in the medium- and long-term contract transactions.