Abstract
Abstract Despite the extensive work on the Safavid thinker Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) nowadays in metropolitan academia, certain areas of philosophical and theological concern remain understudied, if studied at all – and even then, there is little attempt to consider his work in the light of philosophical analysis. We know of a venerable philosophical tradition of analysing the question of providence as a means for examining questions of creation (ex nihilo or otherwise), the problem of evil, determinism and free will, and the larger question of theodicy (and whether this world that we inhabit is indeed the ‘best of all possible worlds’). I propose to examine these questions through an analysis of a section of the theology in al-Asfār al-arbaʿa (The Four Journeys) of Mullā Ṣadrā (mawqif VIII of safar III) and juxtapose it with passages from his other works, all the while contextualising it within the longer Neoplatonic tradition of providence and evil. The section of the Asfār plays a pivotal role in outlining a wider theory of divine providence: following the analysis of the Avicennian proof for the existence of God as the Necessary Being and her attributes, and before the culmination on the emanative scheme of creation (or the incipience of the cosmos – ḥudūṯ al-ʿālam), Mullā Ṣadrā discusses the question of divine providence where one can clearly discern the influence of previous thinkers on him, namely Avicenna (d. 428/1037, al-Šifāʾ and Risālat al-ʿišq) al-Ġazālī (d. 505/ 1111, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn), and Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240, al-Futūḥāt al-makkīya). The section can be divided into four discussions: defining providence as well as the nature of good and evil, accounting for the ‘presence’ of evil in the cosmos, the ‘best of all possible worlds’, and erotic motion of the cosmos as well as the erotic attraction of humans for one another and back to their Origin. What emerges, however, is an account of providence that is subservient to Mullā Ṣadrā’s wider ontological commitment to the primary reality of being, its modulation and essential motion – the tripartite doctrines of aṣālat al-wuǧūd, taškīk al-wuǧūd and al-ḥaraka al-ǧawharīya – and fits within his overall approach to the procession of the cosmos from the One as a divine theophany and its reversion back to the One through theosis. Thus, an analysis of providence and evil demonstrates that underlying significance of Mullā Ṣadrā’s metaphysical commitments to a modulated monism.
Highlights
Considering Divine Providence in Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) 319 al-wuǧūd and al-ḥaraka al-ǧawharīya – and fits within his overall approach to the procession of the cosmos from the One as a divine theophany and its reversion back to the One through theosis
I propose to examine these questions through an analysis of a section of the theology in al-Asfār al-arbaa (The Four Journeys) of Mullā Ṣadrā and juxtapose it with passages from his other works, all the while contextualising it within the longer Neoplatonic tradition of providence and evil
The Safavid philosopher Mullā Ṣadrā Šīrāzī (d. 1045/1636) was not the first to tackle the issue of the existence of evil and grapple with the problem of theodicy in Islamic thought, a matter which is closely linked on the one hand with the providential ‘best of all possible worlds’ theodicy as articulated in detail by the early theologian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ġazālī (d. 505/1111), and on the other hand with understanding how perfection has to provide for its opposition within itself and
Summary
For Plotinus, the providential order on the one hand is an expression of the desire and attainment of the good and on the other a necessary manifestation of the sensible world’s ontological dependence upon the intelligible (Enneads III.2.5.6–7, III.2.1.21–26).[19]. The first is in his gloss on a passage from book VI, chapter 5 of the Metaphysics of al-Šifāon the nature of evil as a digression that Avicenna makes on types of purpose: Know that the existence of the principles of evil belong to the second part of these divisions For example, it is necessary within divine providence (which is munificence) that every possible existent should be given the good existence [proper to it]; and, [since] the existence of composites derives from the elements (it being impossible for the composites not to be formed from the elements); and [since] the elements belonging to the composites cannot be other than earth, water, fire, and air; and [since] it is impossible for fire to exist in the manner that leads to the good end for which it is intended unless it burns and disintegrates [things], it follows necessarily from this that [fire] is such that it would harm good people and corrupt many composites.[68]. This again recalls Proclus’ distinction between essential or metaphysical evils, and phenomenal evils that are ‘parasitic’ and can lead to the good, as well as the contention that the good entails its ‘quasi’-contrary of evil, and the goodness of the created order requires the existence of phenomenal evils
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