Abstract
Abstract We show that in infinite worlds the following three conditions are incompatible: (1) The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. (2) All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. (3) One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is more costly to endorse (1) than has been previously acknowledged.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
