Abstract
This paper analyzes communities' choices of revenue instruments, such as property taxes, land taxes, housing revenues, fees, and head taxes, in an imperfect competition framework. Developer-dominated, or profit-maximizing communities generally prefer fees or charges to taxes; while voter-dominated, or utility-maximizing communities prefer taxes to fees. The impact of balanced budget constraints, restrictions on the choices of instruments, and public service choices are also analyzed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
