Abstract
This paper uniquely examines an international mixed oligopoly in a model of spatial price discrimination. It isolates the importance of the location of the border showing a variety of equilibria depending on the nationality and placement of the private rivals. While the presence of a public firm often improves domestic welfare, it need not. Moreover, a prisoner’s dilemma can exist in which each country would benefit from the privatization of both public firms but neither country has a unilateral incentive to privatize. The implications are discussed.
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