Commentary] On the Existence of Mem (מ)

Abstract

We define a set of things of one singular kind as the set of all things that can causally affect one another. To enable causal interaction between such sets, we define a thing that is of a _non_-singular kind as consisting of more than one singular kind. Such a thing of a non-singular kind supervenes on things of singular kinds and is open to causally intervene between sets of things of different singular kinds without violating the definition of a set of things of one singular kind. With the empty set as a set of things of one singular kind, we define _Mem_ as ‘either the smallest element of intervening sets in the indefinite set of sets of things of a singular kind and the intermediate supervening sets, or, if nothing exists, the empty set’. Thus, Mem exists. _Comment_. The argument focuses on a definition of a supervening set of things of a non-singular kind. Besides that, it really only claims that if we define Mem as some set of existing things or the set without elements, Mem exists. That, though, is tautological. The argument, thus, can only be interesting if anything besides the empty set exists. That only the empty set would exist, however, is refuted by this very claim.