Cold War Command: The Dramatic Story of a Nuclear Submariner

Abstract

The history of submarine operations during the Cold War has by now been told many ways, but typically from the American point of view. Cold War Command: The Dramatic Story of a Nuclear Submariner adds an important dimension to this literature by coming at the confrontation between Soviet and Western submarine forces from the perspective of the Royal Navy. Despite the title, Cold War Command is less a dramatic story of nuclear submarine operations and more a narrative of Captain Dan Conley's career as a Royal Navy submariner against the backdrop of the Cold War, including some nuclear but also diesel submarine operations. Written with Captain Richard Woodman, a distinguished maritime historian, the book offers an effective telling of the waxing and waning in importance of the Royal Navy's submarine flotilla during the Cold War, including details such as the challenges associated with shipbuilding, maintenance, and weapons effectiveness, which are often omitted from accounts of submarine operations.As Admiral The Lord Boyce makes clear in his introduction, details of the missions conducted by the silent services—that is, the submarine forces of the United States Navy, the Royal Navy, and those of other Western allies—remain classified for good reasons. Yet Woodman and Conley manage to bring the reader into that world by conveying an appreciation of the rising strategic importance of nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), which carried sea-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Effectively creating a new class of capital ships, this Cold War development required a new breed of nuclear-powered hunter killer submarines (SSNs) to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk, protect the United Kingdom's own SSBNs, and conduct clandestine intelligence collections.For the reader interested in the thrilling exploits of the Royal Navy hunter-killer submarines, Woodman and Conley do not disappoint. Their account of the submarines lost at sea during the Cold War is harrowing even when presented in a professionally disinterested voice, with losses by Soviet, British, French, and U.S. forces alike. Moreover, their account of engaging Soviet SSNs that were specifically designed to protect Soviet SSBNs demonstrates the importance of the Royal Navy's constant struggle to improve the professionalism, tactics, and material readiness of the submarine flotilla. Despite these efforts, the Soviet Navy occasionally got the upper hand. So Conley's success in detecting and tracking five Soviet submarines in one deployment while remaining undetected, as Woodman and Conley describe under the colorful heading of “the Black Pig and the Red Banner Fleet,” was quite a feat even with a fair measure of good fortune in the mix.One of the strengths of Cold War Command is that it goes beyond submarine operations and deals with the impact of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) decision to invest in a sea-based nuclear deterrent. In Great Britain, struggling with the contraction of empire as well as recovering from the ravages of the Second World War, this inevitably required trade-offs not only with the other services but within the Royal Navy. The resources required to build and sustain a nuclear submarine force as the country's reliable bulwark were substantial. Woodman and Conley perform an important service in capturing the tragic waste of resources caused by mismanagement in British shipbuilders and repair yards over this period, as well as the Royal Navy's culture of making do that allowed poor weapons performance to hinder war-fighting effectiveness for far too long.Although resolution of these issues took years, or decades in some cases, this internal MOD struggle was an essential part of the Cold War story for Great Britain. Woodman and Conley suggest two important consequences. One was the attendant reduction in resources made available to other British forces, which caused tremendous strain when British forces had to meet the challenges of the Falklands War. This overseas war was a much tougher fight for the British than it should have been because of the imbalances in the fleet among submarines and other combatants and aviation capabilities brought about by the Cold War. Until the most serious problems—the poor design and ineffective corrective actions for the Tigerfish and Spearfish torpedoes, as well as lack of an effective anti-surface missile until deployment of the sub-Harpoon by the Royal Navy—were resolved, they constrained the ability of Royal Navy SSNs to engage and sink the enemy in the event of a full-scale confrontation with the Soviet Union.By following Conley's career, which included tours of duty with both the Royal Navy's Submarine Weapons and Tactics Group and the U.S. Navy's Submarine Development Squadron Twelve, Command at Sea offers a useful comparison of training and tactical preparation between the allied silent services. Even though each navy took a different approach, this was a truly joint effort that resulted in multiple shared successes; notably with tactics for use with towed acoustic arrays or with exercises to evaluate torpedo performance under the Arctic ice. The American reader may find Conley's experiences in the deservedly famous Royal Navy “Perisher” course for prospective commanding officers (PCO) to be of interest. Conley himself is scrupulous if understated in meting out criticism as well as praise, and his particular comparison of Perisher with the U.S. submarine PCO course is insightful and worth reading.Overall, I recommend this book for its detail, insight, and unique perspective on the history of the Cold War beneath the waves. The book should be especially enlightening for those interested in a contrast between the U.S. and Royal Navy approaches to submarines in the context of maintaining naval power during the Cold War.