Closeness, Expenditures, and Turnout in the 2000 Presidential Election

Abstract

ABSTRACT In this article I examine whether turnout in the 2000 presidential election was influenced by closeness and candidate expenditures. Evidence that closeness affects turnout supports the theory that voters assign more weight to their votes in close elections. Evidence that expenditures increase turnout provides support for the argument that greater mobilization efforts increase turnout in close elections. I test the effect of closeness and expenditures separately and jointly in state- and individual-level multivariate analyses. It is found that closeness affects turnout in the state- and individual-level models when expenditures are omitted. When expenditures are included in the analyses, closeness is rendered insignificant or takes on an unanticipated sign. Although the influence of closeness on turnout is uncertain and variable, expenditure allocation is related to closeness, and in all the analyses, expenditures, measured as presidential advertising and presidential visits, positively impacted turnout in the 2000 election.