Chapter Ten - A Dilemma for Epistemological Disjunctivism

Abstract

I argue that epistemological disjunctivism, as defended by Pritchard (2012) or McDowell (1982/2009), faces a dilemma. To avoid collapsing into the “highest common factor view” (McDowell, 1982/2009, p. 80), it has to combine with a metaphysical brand of disjunctivism. This is so because the epistemological disjunctivist's contention, which veridical perception provides the perceiver with reflectively accessible epistemic reasons that are superior to those provided by hallucination, is tenable only if underwritten by the naïve realist claim that perception is partly constituted by the perceived fact. As I argue, this claim inexorably leads to metaphysical disjunctivism. So, epistemological disjunctivism cannot be advertised as a view that shares some of the advantages of metaphysical disjunctivism but is less extreme and therefore more widely acceptable. In addition to presenting the dilemma, I discuss and reject one route of escape for the epistemological disjunctivist.