Chapter Five - Against the Combination of Materialism and Direct Realism

Abstract

The basic division between physical and phenomenal attributes is developed and defended. To deny this division, one can say observed objects are mere constructs from experience, whether from both actual and hypothetical experiences (phenomenalism) or from actual experiences only (reductive idealism). Alternatively, one can resort to neutral monism or to panpsychism. All four of these approaches are contrary to classical materialism. One could deny the phenomenal, but this denial is contrary to the observed facts. One could say the phenomenal is a direct copy or reflection of the physical, but then what the material world displays will be attributes of things as they are present in conscious awareness, which will make the basis for things be phenomenal attributes, contrary to classical materialism. A sophisticated version of realism is briefly sketched, which allows correspondence without direct copying but also avoids severing the linkage of experience with physical objects.