Chapter 1 - How Does Guilt Differ from Shame?

Abstract

This chapter describes several theoretical distinctions between shame and guilt that have been suggested by social scientists over the years. It begins with the review based on psychoanalytic and anthropological theories. Shame and guilt are frequently mentioned in the same breath, as moral emotions that regulate social behavior, or as potentially problematic affective experiences that lie at the heart of many psychological symptoms. Recent theory and research has identified important differences between these two closely related emotions—differences that appear to have rather profound implications both for psychological adjustment and for social behavior. A common basis for distinguishing between shame and guilt focuses on presumed differences in the types of situations that elicit these emotions. The chapter summarizes recent empirical results that seriously challenge this assumption and describes the breadth of empirical support for Lewis's reconceptualization, which downplays the objective content of eliciting events and instead highlights differences in the individual's interpretation of the role of the self in shame and guilt situations. Consistent with Lewis, a range of studies confirm that distinct phenomenological experiences are associated with shame's focus on the self, and guilt's focus on specific behaviors. This research also indicates that shame and guilt typically lead to very different motivations in interpersonal contexts, with guilt on balance emerging as the more adaptive response to transgressions.