Abstract
Discrete-time dynamic oligopoly games which exhibit chaotic time patters of the competitors’ strategic choices are at the center of a flourishing literature, including the seminal paper by Rand (1978) and several papers after it (see e.g. Dana and Montrucchio, 1986, Puu, 1991, Kopel, 1996), where simple microeconomic situations have been proposed which lead to duopoly games with chaotic dynamics. The main concern, in this stream of literature, is to emphasize the features of the duopoly games which are responsible for the transition from regular to chaotic dynamics and to analyze the bifurcations which cause the loss of stability of the equilibria and the appearance of more complex attractors (see e.g. Bischi et al., 2000).
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