Abstract
This paper extends the analysis of duopoly market by distinguishing two types of competition: (i) the basic form of competition where each firm is unrestricted in its choice of price and quantity and (ii) the non-basic form of competition where firms’ strategic choices over price and quantity are limited a priori. Our analysis focuses on the former rather than the latter. Under a very general setting of concave industrial revenue and asymmetric convex costs, we show that each firm typically makes more profit in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the leader-follower price-quantity competition, one of the basic competition forms, than in the SPNE of the leader-follower price competition and that each firm always makes more profit under simultaneous move price-quantity competition than under simultaneous move price competition. We establish a generalized framework for endogenous timing in duopoly games which is capable of embodying and overcoming the inconsistency across the existing three frameworks in the field. We highlight the advantages of a 3-period general framework.
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