Channeling approach of prosumer connection costs considering regional differences in China — Evolutionary game among distributed photovoltaic entities

Abstract

The self-generation and self-use attributes of distributed photovoltaic increase the line costs of grid enterprises, and these costs are mainly borne by regional power users and grid enterprises. With the expansion of distributed photovoltaic scales and the rise of profit rates, distributed photovoltaic operators should also become one of the main contributors to the grid connection costs. Distributed photovoltaic grid connection cost related researches focus on its impact on the regional users of transmission and distribution prices. Alternative apportionment of grid connection cost on distributed photovoltaic related subjects of the impact of the research is less. Based on the theory of evolutionary game, this paper constructs a four-party game model among roof owners, grid enterprises, PV enterprises and the government, and takes 30 regions in China as examples to measure the impacts of different grid connection cost sharing schemes on the decision-making of the stakeholders. At the same time, it considers the impacts of the DPV cost, the grid connection cost and the proportion of self-consumption of DPV on the results of the evolutionary game. The results of this study are used to propose policy recommendations on the sharing of grid connection costs for distributed photovoltaic in China.