Changing the rules to win the game again: does presidential term-limit evasion affect measures of electoral integrity?

Abstract

ABSTRACT Presidential term-limit evasion (TLE) is inconsistent with international human rights, and researchers have linked the practice to democratic backsliding. Yet, this practice has much to uncover, including how different TLE tactics (constitutional court ruling, legislative change, referendum) influence electoral integrity. We expect the increase in the incumbent advantage and the imbalance in the separation of powers obtained through TLE to affect the integrity of the subsequent elections in which the evading leader is running. To test this, we analyse an original dataset of 414 presidential terms in 63 African and Latin American countries (1988–2019), using mixed-effects models to investigate each tactic’s effect on different electoral measures, including overall quality perception, Electoral Management Body Autonomy, election day irregularities, vote buying, and intimidation. We confirm our expectations, further finding that the court mode specifically consistently precedes the worst effects on electoral quality, EMB Autonomy, irregularities, intimidation, and voter registry accuracy.